|
Post-Autistic Economics Network |
from post-autistic economics newsletter : issue no. 5, March, 2001
Gilles Raveaud (co-founder of Autisme-Économie)
In this article, we present the reasons for our discontent
as students of economics in France (1.) and find that they have a broad cause
: the (desperate) quest of economists for scientificity
(2.). Our proposal is to turn the teaching of economics in a completely
different direction, where teaching of controversies would be given priority
(3.). We then explain why teaching through controversies is preferable to
current methods (4.), and, well, how to do it (5.). Finally, we offer a very tentative insight into
the theory of knowledge, by pointing out affinities between the classical
works of Max Weber and those of Tony Lawson. We then suggest that this more
general framework of comparisons (in a well defined sense) may prove a useful
guide, not only for teaching, but for research as well. 1. Reasons for our discontent I will briefly review here the
reasons for our discontent, as expressed in our petition (full text on our
website: www.autisme-economie.org) : - First, we criticized the
construction of “imaginary worlds” by economists. That is, worlds which do
not have any link with any plausible mechanism in reality. Such worlds (the
famous “models”) are just developed for their own sake, because of their tractability.
We no longer want to be taught such fairy tales, the aim of which is not to
explain « reality », but just to show the ability of the writer to
construct a « nice model ». It may be fun for the authors, but we
do not want to be part of the game. - Second, we highlighted the
excessive use of maths in the curriculum. Here, the situation is well known
and does not require further explanation. Let me just emphasize the fact that
in France, the fascination with maths is particularly developed, and the level
required of students extremely high in most cases. - Third, we stressed the fact
that most « explanations » given in lectures are derived from
neo-classical economics. Marxism and Keynesianism, just to name a few
alternate views, which were living schools of thought in France not so long
ago seem to have completely disappeared[1][1]. Nowadays, virtually no student has the
opportunity to study Marx as part of the common curriculum. Furthermore, the
explanations given are not thought of and presented as possible explanations of complex phenomena (say, unemployment, or
international trade), competing with different approaches. They are supposed
to be the only possible economic analysis of such phenomena, in the following
sense: even if people do not actually behave according to these views, it is
because other elements (social, traditions, imperfections, etc.) blur the
picture. But the proper economic part of their activity is as defined. As one can see, the situation is
disastrous[2][2]. As so many writers have already given
possible reasons for such a situation in economics, we will simply focus on
one aspect of the problem: the quest for scientificity
for economists. There are two reasons for selecting this problem: first,
these are the terms which have been used by teachers reacting to the first
teachers’ petition, which supported our views. Second, we consider it as the
central source of our problems, even if this view is only a conjecture and is
subject to revision. 2. The underlying causes: seeking for scientificity A few weeks after launching our
petition in May 2000, we were supported by a petition from teachers, signed
by approximately 140 teachers, with some very famous people among them (Aglietta, Orléan, Boyer, etc.).
This text from the teachers stressed the lack of pluralism in economics and
rejected the overall domination of neo-classical economics on courses. Later on, another text, signed
by only a dozen economists, but nearly all of them important in the
Establishment, reacted against both the students’ and teachers’ petitions.
Their purpose was, as they put it, to « preserve the scientificity
of economics ». This had to be done in the most traditional of ways,
following the known recipe. The
following principles were insisted upon in this tract: - First, the “precise
identification and definition of concepts and behaviours which characterize
economic activity (consumption, production, investment, etc.) and the
formulation of basic hypotheses concerning such behaviours.” - Second, “the formulation of
theories expressed as formalised relationships between the concepts
previously defined ” - Third, “the verification of
such theories through experience. This can only take place through
confrontation with history, as quantified by statistics and econometrics. They then denied that there was
any illegitimate domination by neo-classical economics : any views are
valid, as long as they respect this canvas. One can note that their reaction
did not engage with our criticism: where we talked about teaching, they talked about science.
They did not answer any of our points : imaginary worlds, the excess of
maths and lack of pluralism. Instead, they gave us a mythical description of
science, where everyone is simply doing their best with their limited means
(isn’t that rational ?). In short, leaving the classrooms, the debate
was now entering the field of methodology. So much the better, as this
suddenly gave coherence to our protest. We had focused on specific points
which, through related, did not lead to any necessary coherence. Now, with
the help of the « counter-appeal », we had more than coherence: we
had a common cause. Let’s take this case seriously[3][3]. In the construction of a
« science » so naively understood, one has few options. The
phenomena studied, even analysed as « stylised facts », are so
complex that you have to choose among them if you want to produce a
« result ». From claiming to be global, the analysis in fact turns
partial. Then, if your purpose is to construct logical relationships between
« objects » (to be defined), you can hardly do without maths. But
then again, as you progress, things will get just so complicated - leading
either to many solutions or none at all - that you’ll have to spend your time
simplifying your hypotheses. Besides, for reasons which
cannot be explained here, the dominant view in neoclassical economics is that
everything starts with the individual, you then have to define your
« individuals » as narrowly as possible. Actually, you will not
deal with « individuals », nor even economic « agents »
any more : you simply declare them to be their (unobservable) preference
curve, and that’s it. You then have a solid basis on which to ground your
calculations. Does this lead to any analytical success? We know that it hardly
does. Even the logical basis of such a
simple phenomenon as the « law of supply and demand » cannot be
established[4][4]. The logical consequence is that
the whole approach should be re-thought. But as the « scientificity » of economics is to preserved, this
is not an option. You have to follow this road, produce results, refine your
hypotheses, in order to « make science progress ». You are not
going to give up the possibility of constructing a science, are you? Following the magi’s’ scientific
recipe has three consequences: - First, models are not supposed
to be realistic: their aim is not to give insights into real phenomena, but
to participate in the global and fascinating construction of a science. One
can no longer criticise models on the grounds of irrelevance. From the point of view of this major
achievement, which is the construction of a general economic science,
universally valid, these models are, on the contrary, perfectly relevant.
But, yes, in a sense, they are « imaginary ». - Second, science understood
this way has to be mathematical. There is no precise reason for that, apart
from the fact that any science is mathematical, isn’t it ? You would not
call sociology a science, would you ? As economists, theoreticians deal
with quantitative data (inflation rates, balance sheets, etc.), so there is
no reason for them not to use them. More fundamentally, their purpose is to
construct a general and logical theory, on the model of classical physics[5][5] – so they need maths. And, as they need
maths for research, maths needs to be taught[6][6]. So there cannot be an excess in the
use of maths. The only possible difficulty is not enough maths, or inadequate
maths. But not too much. - Third, as their aim is, I hope
you’ve understood it by now, the construction of a « science », the
idea of competing theories is nonsense. Well, of course, you can debate
specific problems, propose different tools, but this game is required to take
place on the same field. You cannot play against someone situated on a
different pitch, can you? We need common rules, a common language. So you
have to learn this language first of all: after that, you will be absolutely
free to make any use of it, honest. The points we highlighted are
not here by random. Even more, as we hope to have shown it, they are not a problem for those who
subscribe to the line of « scientificity ». They are, on the contrary,
perfectly coherent. That is, our critics can no longer concern themselves
only with teaching: they have to encompass theory as well, and methodology.
Let’s turn back to the image of
science insisted upon by those economists : aren’t there any conflicts
of power, any competing views on the good in economics? Aren’t there
completely opposed conceptions of what a society and an economy is among
economists? Does everybody agree on the way to produce scientific analyses of
economic problems? To put it frankly, the conception of science those
economists have is really naïve: many works, written by sociologists studying
natural sciences, have shown how
knowledge is constructed through
the conflict of theories[7][7]. Moreover, they’ve shown how the
permanence of such debates is intrinsic to science, and is, one could say,
its engine. No science is a calm and eternally defined pitch. On the contrary, its lines are constantly
evolving, and sometimes scientists do not even agree on the shape of the ball
! Would economics be an exception?
Fortunately not. One knows how economics has been the scene of terrific
fights over the years since its very origin, whenever one locates that
beginning. Moreover, the point of such battles was often over the very
foundations of the discipline (the forms of the lines of the pitch), not only
its methodology (the rules of the game) and objects (shape of the ball, if
any). Such controversies do exist in economics, they are numerous and
persistent. What does
« controversy » mean? A strict definition of it could be the
following : A formulates a theory, that B criticises, A replies, and so
on. Examples of such controversies are for example, the « Vining-Koopmans » controversy on the place and role
of maths and theory in economics. The controversy started with Koopmans qualifying Burns and Mitchell Business Cycles of « measurement
without theory », because it was not based on neo-classical grounds. In
his reply, Vining pointed out that Koopmans’ judgement relied on a stringent definition of
economics, according to which only his approach (neo-classical theory) was
valid, although he had no firm results which showed the productivity of such
an approach. The controversy concerned the definition of acceptable theory
and the reasons why neo-classical economics should be preferred[8][8]. As one can see, this controversy
has never been settled : there is no « scientific answer » to
the problems raised above, even if the majority of economists support one
view rather than the other at a certain time. This is what economics is really about : conflicting views
about problems and the way to deal with them ; competing claims on which
policy to support. This is just so obvious that one is surprised to have to
recall this. Newspapers are filled with economists contradicting one another
on the policies to be followed, because their theories differ. Everyone knows
that there is no such thing as an economic science, at least not in the sense
understood above, but the students are required to believe there is. Only
economics students are supposed to believe that there is a knowledge about
economic facts which is coherent, precise, and which leads to clear policy
recommendations. 4. Teaching through controversies Controversies, even understood
in the restricted sense given above, are numerous in economics (see the
classical debates on value ; the question of the nature and measurement of
capital ; Keynes and Hicks on the IS-LM model ; Romer
and Solow on growth theory ; etc.) But one can
understand controversies in a broader sense : that is, the competing
views on recurring problems in economics. Theories of consumption are an
excellent example of this: starting with the Keynesian « consumption
function », one can trace back the attempts by Brown, Modigliani and Duesenberry to « save » the Keynesian function.
One can then turn to Friedman’s radical criticism, with his « permanent
income hypothesis », and its revision through the life-cycle model. All these models are not to be
presented as trials and errors on the road to an ever better theory : on
the contrary, they are to be presented as what
they are, that is, conflicting views on an economic problem of central
importance. In particular, such theories, and the differences between them,
simply cannot be understood if one is not aware of their consequences in
terms of economic policy. Teaching these models should be quite different
than at present; each theory should be presented on an equal footing, given
its chances in the competition of science. In particular, one should focus
not only on the « model » itself (if any), but also on three crucial
aspects of the problems surrounding the use of the model: the context of the
debate ; the role and place of empirical data ; the consequences
for economic policy. As one can see, teaching is much
more demanding in this context, as it is supposed to encompass all the
dimensions of the problem under consideration. In fact, what we are
suggesting here may already exist, in some shape or other, but, even if it is
the case, it is done through various courses, which are not linked to one
another. Statistics are taught for their own sake, with no or little
reference to economic theory ; the history of thought very often
overlooks the mathematical contents of theories ; and economic theory is
presented as being autonomous from everything else. The complete absence of
economics textbooks constructed in the way we propose is a clear indication
of this disastrous « division of labour » among researchers and
teachers. As a result of the present state
of teaching, the student does not acquire any knowledge of the economy he
lives in, nor of the competing theories that set out to explain it. With what
we propose here, it could be hoped that both lacks would be filled :
controversies make theories lively and real ; and their empirical
content gives us knowledge of « facts », as we show below.
Teaching should focus on
controversies, past and present. The idea of neutral tools would quite simply
disappear. « Micro » and « macro » lessons would be
replaced by a single and large course on « economic theories »,
presenting them in the way described above, in historical (and not logical)
order. There would then be the time to present Classical and Marxian approaches
seriously, spending time on reading texts, and not simply solving silly
ready-made exercises. In practice, this implies that neo-classical theory
should not be taught in the first year, and perhaps even not in the second
year. Besides, we propose a broad course on political philosophy, explaining the ethical and political
backgrounds and the consequences of the theories proposed. A canvas would therefore be laid
down for a stimulating debate inside economic departments : theories
would be presented as being in permanent confrontation with one another, the
course on economic theories following their historical development and
reasons for success and decline. As we stressed above, the purpose of such a
course would be to present both the
historical context of the theories and
their precise analytical content[9][9]. This would be completed by the
political philosophy course, which would show the permanence of questions
such as the role of the State in economic matters; the fairness of the
market; the definition of money; etc. and the varying answers given to such
questions through history. Statistics and econometrics
would then be taught in close relationship with such lessons. Even if these
subjects are necessarily autonomous in the sense that they need to present
their own techniques, tutorials (at least) should be entirely devoted to the
examination of problems linked with what is presented in the two courses
defined above (how does one measure the « natural rate of
unemployment »? How did it evolve in the UK or the US or Gambia? What is
« purchasing power parity » and how to measure it? How can one
measure the value of the Keynesian multiplier nowadays in a particular
country? What is the value of the rate of profit ; is it declining? etc.).
In particular, it is important that students should work on real data, with
its imperfections, and not, once again, on artificial sources[10][10]. A common and simple consequence
of all this is that we would get rid
of all ready-made exercises. Well, one or two may be tolerated, as they
are useful aids to understanding a
theory precisely. But the aim of teaching should no longer be the mastering
of such tools. They should remain what they should never have ceased to be,
that is, analytical tools with limited relevance. The object and purpose of
economics and its teaching is the world outside: what do we know about it?
How do we know it? Do we all agree on this knowledge, and if not, why? What
do our theories have to say about it? And above all, to be honest: how to
make it a better place to live in?
|