sanity,
humanity and science
post-autistic economics
review
Issue no.
17; December 4, 2002
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In this issue:
-
Stephen T. Ziliak
Economic
History and the Rebirth of Respectable Characters
-
Steve Fleetwood
Why Neoclassical
Economics Explains Nothing at All
- Tony
Aspromourgos
Defining "Economics" Inclusively
-
Yves Gingras
Beautiful Mind, Ugly Deception
-
Ingrid Robeyns
In Defence of Amartya Sen
-
Robert Scott Gassler
Economics Outside the (Edgeworth) Box
-
Comment:
Grischa Periono responds
to Wolff
Economic
History and the Rebirth of Respectable Characters
Stephen
T. Ziliak (Georgia Institute of Technology and
Emory University, USA)
How long can irony and
cynicism sustain the economics profession?
When will we see the rebirth of the Intellectual, the Social Activist,
and the Teacher as respectable characters in the world of economics? (Arjo Klamer, 1990)
I've been asked to name some
contributions that economic history can make to the Post-Autistic Economics
Movement. The occasion made me think
of the questions Arjo Klamer
asked in The Making of an Economist (Westview
Press, 1990: 185), his study with David Colander of graduate students at the
universities of Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, MIT, Stanford, and Yale.
I thought of Klamer's
question - - how long till the rebirth? - - because in America, the study of
economic history was killed off with the Intellectual, the Social Activist,
and the Teacher. The timing was
ironic. I am not referring to the
literal killings in Paris or Budapest or Mississippi (though the connection
is worth exploring).
The irony is that when Harvard cut a
full-year of history from the core of its graduate program in the 1960s (a
fashion that was completed at most schools, including Chicago, by the
mid-1970s), economic history was simultaneously and radically transforming.1 Historians at Harvard and Purdue were its
prime movers. It was a fantastic
re-invention of the field, and brought - - as such things go in the human
sciences - - a new methodology, a change of guard at the journals, and a
large increase in output, prestige, and resources. In 1993 two inventors of "the new economic
history," Robert Fogel and Douglass North,
were awarded the Nobel Prize.
Tragically, many economists could not say why.
Economic history, then, is in one
story a victim and a failure. As
Deirdre McCloskey put it, the new economic historians had spent most of their
energy explaining to departments of history the "wonderful
usefulness" of economics.2
But they forgot to sell their wares to their own hiring and curriculum
committees--in economics. (McCloskey's
article was published in 1976 in the Journal of Economic Literature. She tried to stop George Stigler from
taking history out of Chicago's curriculum.)
Economic historians continue to speak in the wonderfully useful
language of statistics and constrained maximization. But to the Samuelsonians
of the Seventies who crafted the curriculum of micro-macro-and metrics while
fetching money to mathematize economics, the
numerate historians' talk of politics, religion, institutions, open fields,
lacks of freedom, legacies of slavery, narrative voice, contested meanings,
census manuscripts, personal diaries, and plantation account books was, to
use a technical term from the sociology of science, "humanities
crap." A real economist was a
Problem Solver, a calculus wonk.
Economic history, then, like foreign
languages and the history of thought,
was killed when the Problem Solvers killed the Intellectual, the
Activist, and the Teacher–“the respectable
characters.” It's difficult to
imagine a re-valuation and legitimization of these social roles - - so
central to a post-autistic economics - - without a simultaneous revival of
historical inquiry.
Now it's true that some people, loyal
to the new Chicago School, have called the ahistorical
Problem Solver, Robert Lucas, an intellectual. If you begin with standard Samuelsonian assumptions, then yes, Lucas is. If an intellectual is someone fastened to
the belief that there is one way of doing "operational" economics
"consistent with" real "science," if an intellectual (in
published work) has read mainly in some corners of engineering mathematics
and rational choice, free market economics, if an intellectual is a person
who does not value social or cultural history as a mode of economic
understanding, if an intellectual is someone unwilling to argue in his own
seminar his privileging of a simple utilitarian social welfare function (for
example, in Iowa City, Iowa, in 1994), then yes, Lucas is definitely an
intellectual. Similarly, under Samuelsonian assumptions, Robert Barro
is a Teacher, George W. Bush is an Orator, and Gary Becker is a Social
Activist (in Tantric healing).
In other words, one contribution of
history to post-autistic economics is this: valuing economic history for the
serious economics it is (while retaining what it is now perceived to be:
serious history) will hasten to economics the return of the lost and
wandering tribes of respectable characters.
(One example of the potential gain can be found in Nicholas Dawidoff's The Fly Swatter [New York: Random
House, 2002]. It's an amazing and sad
story of the great economic historian, Alexander Gerschenkron,
who was twice forced to wander.) A
group of French students in the post-autistic movement have suggested a new
curriculum, setting theirs against present-day Chicago (PAE
Review 4, 29 Jan 2000). They propose
to put economic history back in to the core curriculum.
Why should a post-autistic economist
study history? McCloskey's rubrics
from 1976 provide some of the answers:
History
has more facts.
When today's economists begin a paper on America's Welfare Reform Act
of 1996 they of course introduce the subject historically. But because they do not collect facts from
history they get the facts wrong. The
Institute for Research on Poverty (IRP), which is
meaningful to me for many reasons, and partly because my brother is a
research affiliate with them, is unfortunately a good example. The IRP believes
that poverty and the collective strategies to eradicate it began with
President Johnson's War on Poverty.
(To be fair, some will refer to the Great Depression. But their data sets still begin in the
1960s.) America has had poverty and
public assistance since the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601.3 In the late nineteenth century the largest
cities abolished "public outdoor relief"--the tax-financed
subsidies in cash and in kind.
Abolition was part of the charity organization movement, a British
import that attempted to privatize, moralize, scientize,
localize, and personalize poverty and charity. It's an open secret that the 19th century
experiment inspired today’s Republicans to abolish entitlements. Data on the failed movement are voluminous
and contain evidence relevant to the Act of 1996.4
History
has better facts.
Economic historians - - for example, Simon Kuznets,
Eli Heckscher, John R. Commons, Lance Davis,
Stanley Engerman, Jeffrey Williamson, Susan Carter,
Richard Sutch, Roger Ransom, William Sundstrom, Gavin Wright, Warren Whatley, Claudia Goldin, Robert Margo, Emily Mechner,
Elyce Rotella, Lee Craig,
Ann Carlos, Dora Costa, Fernand Braudel,
Joel Mokyr, Yasukichi Yasuba, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Pierre Bourdieu, Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, Nancy Folbre, Kyle
Kaufmann, Thomas Weiss, Sam Williamson, Jeremy Atack,
Rick Steckel, John Murray, Joerg
Baten, William Collins, George Selgin,
Robert Higgs, Price Fishback, Shawn Kantor, Hugh Rockhoff, Peter Lindert, Avner Greif, Joan Hannon, Robert Humphreys, George Boyer, Mary
MacKinnon, Timothy Hatton, Cormac O'Grada, Richard Easterlin, Gus
Giebelhaus, Metin Cosgel, Mary Beth Combs, and Santhi
Hejeebu - - collect their own facts. You can see that it’s the industry
standard. Laboring
in the archives yields an intimate knowledge of the scope and limitations of
facts collected. Downloading a *.gif
file from www.economagic.com does not.
In our second look at significance testing in the American Economic
Review (this time we examined the 1990s) McCloskey and I found that among
all the subfields of economics, the historians and labor
economists pay most attention to the economic significance of their
estimates.
History yields
better theory. What caused the Great Depression? A Problem Solver in the mid-1990s put to
paper one answer, and gave it to me: "a technology shock in a real
business cycle model." There is in
truth little consensus. But Milton
Friedman, Anna J. Schwartz, John Kenneth Galbraith, Peter Temin,
Charles P. Kindleberger, Barry Eichengreen,
and many other historians have advanced the theoretical conversation by
insisting their theory connect with actual world events.
History makes
better policy. The history of welfare is a case in point:
"time limits" do not produce self-sufficient wages. But then, most economic policy is a
case in point. "The competitive
supply of professional services in the nineteenth century, it is said,
grievously injured consumers, justifying official cartels of doctors and
undertakers." So midwifery and
home birth have been virtually outlawed in the United States. "If marijuana were legally and
competitively supplied there would be a huge increase in demand for
it." Hey, I mean, look at that
Robitussin go! "The United States
will not lift the embargo on Cuba," President Bush told a crowd in Miami
in Spring 2002, "because that would make Castro rich and therefore more
difficult to remove." I just
got here, you can almost hear him dreaming. C’mon, America, give embargoes a
chance.
The rhetoric of Problem Solving needs
revising. What is the point of
emphasizing the size of the t-test, or formalizing the set of pooling equilibria, if history shows that you are solving the
wrong problem? A non-experimental
science ought to look at real world experiments when nature coughs them
up. For example, economists have much to learn about policy from East
and West Germany by looking at them when they were together, then separate,
then together again. Likewise in South
Africa and in Palestine. The labor economists David Card and Alan Krueger were not the
first to see `natural experiments' in the adoption of minimum wage
legislation; the method is old and historically sound. Still, the laboratory of history is
strangely under-utilized by the Problem Solver.
History
makes better economists. Arjo Klamer and David Colander asked their sample of graduate
students to name the "most respected economists" (p. 42). At every school except Chicago, at least
half the heroes listed (there are no women on the lists) did their
significant work in historical economics: they are Smith, Marx, Veblen, Keynes, Hicks (part-time), Schumpeter, Myrdal, Polanyi, John Kenneth
Galbraith, and Friedman. And still
others on the list, such as Boulding, Sen, and Stigler, were deeply historical in the way they
conceived of economic problems.
Economic history is apparently a major field of inquiry for the
world's most respected economists.
Economic history is
their major field because history offers more facts, better facts, better
theory, and better policy. But the
reasons for bringing history back in
exceed those that McCloskey raised against Stigler. Since that time a small but growing band of
economists and historians have allowed discourse, feminism, postmodernism,
and classical rhetoric to affect their work.
Like feminist economics and economic methodology, the conversations of
economic history are now more open and pluralistic. (Easy does it, Clio: it's not like trade
theory but we have a long way to go.)
History provides the alternative stories that give meaning to timeless
models and “obvious” nulls.
History exposes the contested meanings of utility, labor,
freedom, and justice. History keeps us
honest in our assumptions. History
connects teachers of economics to the concerns of the humanities. History connects teachers to the concerns
of minority and international students, and it connects students to the
assumptions and the graphs. For
example, when I introduce undergraduate students to externalities with Upton
Sinclair's The Jungle (1905), or to comparative advantage with
Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath (1939), or to labor
economics with The Philadelphia Negro (1899), by W.E.B.
Du Bois, it is no surprise that women and students
of color become differently engaged.
How can we bring history back
in? First: realize that Chicago and
Columbia do not set world prices for economic education. But when others think they do, distortion–autistic
economics--emerges. In fact, in
another story, economic history is not dead; it’s already back
in. Today’s core curriculum at
Harvard, MIT, Stanford, Berkeley, and Northwestern
University requires from Ph.D. students a satisfactory grade in a course on
economic history during the first or second year of study. It’s not like Gerschenkron’s
Harvard–a full-year of history--and it’s a lot of micro, macro,
and metrics; but clearly, in many of America’s elite programs, economic
history is still inside the core. What
can we do? History stays out of the
curriculum when the Problem Solvers say “that’s not what MIT
does.” Show the problem solvers
that they are wrong. Let it be known,
moreover, that economic historians are the department chairs at Harvard
(Jeffrey Williamson, 1997-2000), Stanford (Gavin Wright, currently, and for a
second time), MIT (Peter Temin, 1994-1997), Northwestern (Joel Mokyr,
1999-2002), Arizona (Price Fishback, currently),
and elsewhere. These Department Chairs are on your side.
Second. I say we call out the
Chicago-Columbia-Harvard-MIT-Stanford-and Yale Ph.D.s who as students had
spoken honestly with Klamer and Colander and are
now writing and teaching as junior or tenured professors. It's time they speak up and say who they
are.
Of the 212 respondents to Klamer's and Colander's survey in the late 1980s, 98%
said that a study of history was at least "moderately important"
and 68% said that history was of highest importance (Klamer
and Colander 1990, Table 2.1, p. 16).
Let me make a plausible out-of-sample observation. Not long ago a knowledge of history was
ranked by today's professors of economics as being of highest importance to
the skills of a good economist, second in importance only to
mathematics. (Seventy-three percent
[73%] said that mathematics was of highest importance [p. 16].) If the respondents have changed their
minds, if a knowledge of what Gerschenkron called
"economic backwardness in historical perspective” is not useful,
if a knowledge of the railroads, or the Poor Laws, or the Beveridge
Plan, or the gold standard, or slavery, or Jim Crow, or the East India
Company, or women's suffrage, or public education, or world war, or free
immigration, or markets before central banking is, they believe, no longer
important, they will of course agree to defend their change of mind at next
year's ASSA meetings. These are nameable professors who could
help to rescue the young from the autism of the middle and to repopulate the
world of economics with respectable characters. These professors are acquiring the power to
change the demand curve. They can
refuse to vote for the pseudo-mathematician, famous for formalizing nothing
of consequence. They can hire
economists who care about the world and its many ways of knowing, and who
show it in their teaching and their scholarship. They can fill the pages of economics with
the image they had of themselves when they were happy.
But I am sorry to say with Nike that
an important way to bring history back in lies solely within you--the
obligation to just do it. There is a
simple proposition that clarifies my point.
If you are going to change the conversation, you have to change the
conversation. Inspired by the critical
pedagogy of Paulo Freire, the African American
writer and English professor, bell hooks, has made a similar point in Teaching
to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom (1994). On the second day of classes I discuss with
my students her Chapter 10, "Building a Teaching Community," which
is a dialogue with a white male philosopher on the history and style of power
and knowledge in the classroom and how to change them. Students find the dialogue to be inspiring
(though sometimes unnerving) for claiming their own power, finding their own
voice, in my classroom. Students for a
post-autistic economics could take "education as the practice of
freedom" as a second motto, a kind of just-do-it.
Education as the practice of freedom
means taking graduate courses in history and other historical sciences, such
as philosophy, biology, anthropology, or communication studies, and then
putting your questions to your teacher, your dissertation, and your seminar
speaker. It is simply not true what
department chairs say, and repeat, with liturgical command, "that there
is no time for those courses." Insisting to the young "that there
is no time" is at best an example of blackboard economics (but the costs
are of course higher than that). Ask,
What did Alex do? Your courage to forge your own path will inspire others to
do the same. Conventional teachers
will be angered and embarrassed by their ignorance and by the fragility of
their top-down and consumerist metaphors of power and knowledge. Who cares.
Science is criticism. They
should learn to take it. Your teacher
of labor economics may bark you off the podium when
you reveal to your classmates the private fantasies and the racist histories
of black people and public assistance that you found in The Bell Curve. Big deal.
How long should irony and cynicism rule the economics profession?
Notes
1. I thank Deirdre McCloskey and Jeffrey G.
Williamson for helping me to put the economic history requirement in
historical perspective. Errors are my
own.
2. Deirdre N. McCloskey, "Does
the Past Have a Useful Economics?" Journal of Economic Literature
(June 1976), 434-61. Reprinted in R. Whaples and D.C. Betts, eds., Historical Perspectives
on the American Economy (Cambridge University Press, 1995), Chapter 1, p.
31.
3. S.T. Ziliak
and Joan Underhill Hannon, "Public Assistance: Colonial Times to the
1920s." Forthcoming in S. Carter,
et. al., eds., Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times
to the Present (Cambridge University Press and U.S. Bureau of the
Census).
4. S.T. Ziliak:
"The End of Welfare and the Contradiction of Compassion," The
Independent Review (Spring 1996); "Some Tendencies of Social Welfare
and the Problem of Interpretation," Cato Journal (Winter 2002);
"Pauper Fiction in Economic Science: 'Paupers in Almshouses' and the Odd
Fit of Oliver Twist," Review of Social Economy (June
2002).
_________________
Steve Ziliak teaches economics at the Georgia
Institute of Technology and Emory University.
He is the editor of Measurement
and Meaning in Economics: The Essential Deirdre McCloskey (Edward Elgar, 2001). In
2002 he was voted "Faculty Member of the Year" by the Georgia Tech
Student Government Association.
_________________________
SUGGESTED CITATION:
Stephen T. Ziliak, “Economic History and the
Rebirth of Respectable Characters”, post-autistic economics
review, issue no. 17, December 4, 2002, article 1. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue17.htm
Why Neoclassical
Economics Explains Nothing At All1
Steve Fleetwood (Lancaster
University, UK)
Introduction
Critical realists (c.f. Lawson 1998; Fleetwood 1999a&b,
2001a&b) argue that neoclassical economics is rooted in the deductivist method.2 Deductivism seeks to 'explain' something by
deducing or predicting a statement about that something from a set of initial
conditions, assumptions, axioms and a covering law and/or some other form of
constant conjunction of events which drives the inferential machinery. These
conjunctions, where for every event y there exists a set of events x1,
x2...xn such that y and x1,
x2...xn are regularly
conjoined, only occur in, and are constitutive of, closed systems.
There are, however, very few spontaneously occurring closed systems in the
natural world, and virtually no non-trivial ones in the socio-economic world.
Using deductivism, therefore, means engineering
artificially closed systems by means
of known falsehoods, reducing neoclassical economics to what Hodgson
(1999: 11) calls ‘the economics of nowhere’. What is not always appreciated, however, is that
the presence of known
falsehoods removes all explanatory power from neoclassical economics. This paper illustrates the point via a
brief analysis of the theory of labour demand.
Closed
system theorising: the example of the theory of labour demand
The law of labour demand, which states that the quantity of labour demanded
varies indirectly with the (real) wage, is an example of one kind of constant
conjunction of events - a Humean law. Incidentally,
the significance of this apparently arcane law should not be underestimated:
it underpins the entire neo-liberal project of making labour markets more
flexible. This constant conjunction is artificially engineered via (at least)
four assumptions known as the Marshall-Hicks conditions. Demand for labour is
alleged to be more elastic if:
1.
The
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is high. The demand for labour will be more
responsive to a change in wages the more easily labour can be substituted for
capital.
2.
The
elasticity of demand for the final product is low. The demand for labour will be more
responsive to a change in wages if the cost increases caused by wage
increases can be passed directly to the consumer without a loss of revenue.
3.
The
share of wages in the total cost of production is high. The demand for labour will be more
responsive to a change in wages if production is labour intensive because
ages constitutes a relatively high
proportion of overall costs.
4.
The
elasticity of supply of other factors is high. The demand for labour will be more
responsive to a change in wages if, when capital is substituted for labour,
the suppliers of this additional capital are able to increase their supply
immediately and effortlessly.
The M-H conditions close the
system: without them there would be no constant conjunctions between changes
in labour demand and changes in the wage. Unfortunately, however, the M-H
conditions also introduce known fictions into the theory. Let us
consider the four M-H conditions as four closure conditions.
Intrinsic closure conditions
(ICC)
To close
the system, the internal state of
individuals must be artificially engineered so that the individual (person,
production system, firm or whatever) always
responds in the same predictable way. The ICC is
maintained, for example, by assuming ubiquitous substitution between labour
and capital.3 Where production involves a relatively fixed crew of
workers operating a relatively fixed set of machinery it is often impossible
to substitute a worker for a machine. Where production requires human emotion
such as a helpful attitude, a machine cannot be substituted for a human. In
some cases substitution of labour for capital is not feasible: how does one
substitute a machine for a nurse to carefully bath an elderly patient? Even
where is it technically possible, substitution is often not socio-politically
possible. If, however, the ubiquity of substitutability is not
assumed, a change in relative factor prices cannot be said to cause the
substitution of labour for capital, and the constant conjunctions of events
that constitute the law of labour demand fail to emerge. Assuming ubiquitous
substitution is a falsehood. Where non-substitutability
is recognised it is treated as a special case. Knowingly false claims
are, thereby, treated as the norm, and knowingly true claims (e.g. that firms may offset a legislated wage
rise by introducing flexible working practices that raise efficiency and
reduce costs) are relegated to an afterthought.
The extrinsic closure condition (ECC)
The ECC ensures that the system is completely
isolated from any external
influences that would violate closure. This occurs by assuming things like:
(a) the suppliers of other factors of production can increase their supply
immediately and effortlessly should need arise, which is unrealistic,
especially when the economy is running near to capacity; and (b) the
elasticity of demand for the final product is low so that firms can pass wage
increases onto customers, which is a rather tenuous assumption in highly
competitive global markets. Maintaining the ECC,
then, often requires falsehoods.
The aggregational closure condition (ACC)
The ACC ensures that the
response remains constant, irrespective of the level of aggregation. Hence,
the need to assume that the share of wages is high no matter what the
industry. If for example, the industry was, or became, highly capital
intensive, an increase in wages might be lost in the overall costs and demand
for labour might not fall following a wage increase. In capital-intensive
industries, then, the ACC is a falsehood.
The reducibility
closure (sub) condition (RCsC)
The RCsC requires the existence of assumptions whose sole
purpose is to ensure mathematical tractability. These are merely
technical assumptions used to ensure the relevant functions are well behaved,
thereby preventing perverse outcomes. Even where substitution of capital for
labour is possible, it is often not continuous or ‘smooth’ but
‘lumpy’. Production functions would have ‘lumps’ in
them and could not be differentiated.
If any of these
four closure conditions are not met (and there are, of course, more ways of
meeting them than mentioned here) constant conjunctions will not emerge. Incidentally, that there are four M-H and four
closure conditions is merely coincidence. Moreover closure requires far
more than the M-H conditions: the latter are merely those explicitly
mentioned in the theory. Other assumptions lie buried within the ceteris paribus clause; are attached
to sub-components of the theory, such as diminishing marginal returns; or are
made by omission.
Neoclassical economists know
perfectly well that they are using falsehoods (hence the reference to known
falsehoods) but often ignore the causes and consequences of
constraints on their freedom to choose the M-H conditions, or assumptions in
general. They cannot choose assumptions on the grounds of their
truth-likeness because the need to maintain systemic closure often overrides
these (and other) considerations – such as descriptive adequacy. Faced
with a decision between adopting an assumption that is known to be false yet closes the
system, and one that is known to be true yet violates closure, the known
falsehood must be chosen or the constant conjunctions will not emerge.
Removal of explanatory power
A damaging
consequence of adopting known
falsehoods is that their presence removes explanatory power, for (at least)
three reasons - on explanation see Runde (1998).
Explanation is not merely efficient
causality
Many
critical realists share with Lipton (1993; 33) the thesis that to ‘explain a phenomenon is to give information on
the phenomenon’s causal history’. The causal history of a
phenomena is not merely (if at all) one couched in terms of the event(s) that
precede the phenomena, but in terms
of the underlying causal mechanisms. One does not, for example, adequately
explain (the event of) a lamp becoming illuminated simply by pointing to the
(event of) flicking of the switch that preceded it. One does not adequately
explain an increase in the demand for labour by pointing to the fall in wages
that (allegedly) preceded it. Yet this form of
‘explanation’ is all deductivism
offers. The overriding necessity of closure requires the removal
(theoretically of course) of all causal mechanisms that might violate the
closure conditions. So, for example, the theory of labour demand omits
reference to trade unions, the introduction or abolition of labour
laws and responses to them, government policy, political ideology, management
systems, different working practices and so on, mechanisms that have
considerable causal impact on labour demand. But here is the rub: once removed from the theory these causal
mechanisms cannot subsequently be recalled and offered as part of the causal
explanation. Relevant causal mechanisms are either included in the theory, in
which case they can contribute to the causal explanation, or they are
excluded, in which case they cannot.
Explanation is not prediction
Prediction does
not constitute explanation. The conflation of prediction and explanation is referred to as
the ‘symmetry thesis’ whereby the only difference between
explanation and prediction relates to the direction of time (Caldwell 1991;
54). Explanation entails the deduction of an event after it has (or is known
to have) occurred. Prediction entails the deduction of an event prior to
(knowledge of) its occurrence. One can, however, predict without explaining anything at all. One can predict the onset of
measles following the emergence of Koplic spots,
but the latter does not explain measles. Even supposing an econometric model
successfully predicted an event (and the predictive power of neoclassical
economics is arguably weak), the regression might be grounded in no economic
theory whatsoever, or be grounded in a theory that contains known falsehoods.
In this case, even a successful prediction would not constitute an
explanation.
Explanation does not allow known falsehoods
If, as part
of a causal account, one includes a known
falsehood, or, leaves out some important causal mechanism (falsehood by
omission) then the ‘explanation’ can immediately be rejected as a
bone fide explanation by pointing to this falsehood. Consider an analogy. In explaining how my rubbish
bags get ripped during the night, I might hypothesise that it is the work of
a fox or I might hypothesise that it is the work of a ghost. The explanation
involving the fox is advanced because I believe it to be true. The
‘explanation’ involving the ghost is known to be false but
is advanced for a pragmatic reason: I want to frighten my young nephew and
stop him playing with the bin bags. Whilst the explanation involving the fox
is valid (even if it turns out to be mistaken) the ‘explanation’
involving the ghost, pragmatically useful as it is, is invalid because it is known
to be a falsehood. One only has to reflect upon this for a moment to see this
conclusion is self-evidently correct: if known falsehoods are allowed to
constitute ‘explanations’ imagine the bizarre explanations that
could be advanced!
Counter arguments considered
Two counter-arguments are commonly deployed to legitimise the use of
known falsehoods. The first runs as follows: ‘all theory has to leave
out the inessential, has to abstract from reality, has to make unrealistic
assumptions, so all theory is inevitably false in the strict sense of the
word’. Now whilst abstraction is legitimate, the process is complex and
cannot be elaborated upon here (c.f. Sayer
1998). I defend my claim with the following observation. Theories like that
of labour demand are replete with such obvious falsehoods that to suggest
they are really (legitimate) abstractions is merely a rhetorical ploy to
avoid methodological discussion. In any case, as noted above most
neoclassical economists admit to knowingly using falsehoods. The second counter-argument invokes
the ‘method of successive approximation’ (Sweezy
1968; 11) or the ‘method of isolation’ (Maki 1992, but see Pratten 1999), and runs as follows. ‘The initial
stages of theorisation use known falsehoods. Explanatory power is added in
stages as realistic assumptions are successively substituted for false
ones’. There are two objections to this.
- The
method of successive approximation or isolation might be appropriate
when the successive analytical steps merely involve the mechanical addition of factors
that were previously assumed away. This mechanical addition is, however,
not appropriate for systems where the elements possess emergent
properties. When, for example new technology is introduced to a
workplace or a new management regime is installed, its behaviour often
evolves, giving rise to properties that were not present before. Many
theoretical propositions derived on the basis of pre-emergent properties
provide no grounds for the analysis of post-emergent forms of
behaviour.
- Theory
is still reliant on closed systems. All that has happened is that one
closed system has been added to another (slightly larger) closed system.
A succession of closed systems does not, however, add up to an open
system. Consider the following example:
ˇ
Closed
system1 assumes demand for labour is determined solely by
wages.
ˇ
Closed
system1 generates the deduction/prediction1 that the
introduction of a minimum wage will cause a fall in labour demand.
ˇ
losed system2 now allows labour
demand to be determined by wages and (say) aggregate demand.
ˇ
System2
is, however, still a closed system: it just contains more variables.
Many of the previous (false) assumptions remain in place and, new (false)
ones are added to ensure closure in this more complex system. Falsehood is
then piled upon falsehood – and the dream of one day removing all false
assumptions evaporates.
The method of successive
approximations, or successive closures might, therefore, be more accurately
termed the ‘method of successive falsehoods’ or the ‘method
of successive closed systems’. In short, the counter-arguments do not
evade the critical realist critique.
Conclusion
To the extent that neoclassical
economic theory is rooted in the deductivist
method, constant conjunctions of events, artificially closed systems and known falsehoods, it explains nothing at all.
Notes
1. I wish to thank Paul Lewis
for his careful comments.
2. Deductivism is also found in some heterodox
(Austrian, Institutionalist, Marxist and
Post-Keynesian) economics whereupon these perspectives also become vulnerable
to the following critique.
3. Neoclassical theorists do, of course, recognise that substitution between
labour and capital is not ubiquitous and attempt to deal with it via
non-convex isoquants. ‘L’ shaped isoquants imply only one production technique based upon
one capital-labour combination and allow no substitution. Isoquants
with n ‘flat’ sections imply n-1 production techniques and allow
limited substitution. But, where tangency between the isocost
curve and the isoquants is at a corner, factor
prices could change without ‘causing’ substitution. Where
tangency occurs along the face of one of the ‘flat’ sections of
the isoquant, then the choice of technique becomes
indeterminate.
References
Caldwell
B. (1991) Beyond Positivism: Economic
Methodology in the Twentieth Century, Unwin
Hyman.
Lipton P. (1993) Inference to the Best Explanation, Routledge.
Fleetwood S. (1999a) ‘The
Inadequacy of Neoclassical Theories of Trade Unions, Labour Vol.13, No.2, pp 445-80.
----- (1999b ed.) Critical Realism in Economics: Development and Debate, (1999) Routledge.
----- (2001a) ‘Causal Laws,
Functional Relations and Tendencies’, Review of Political Economy, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp 201-
220, reprinted in P. Downward (forthcoming 2002) Applied Economics and the Critical Realist
Critique, Routledge.
-----(2001b) ‘What Kind of Theory is Marx’s Labour Theory of Value? A Critical Realist
Inquiry’ Capital & Class 73, pp.41-
77.
Hodgson G. (1999) Economics and Utopia: Why The Learning Society is not
the End of History, Routledge.
Lawson T. (1998) Economics and Reality,
Routledge
Maki U. (1992) ‘On The Method Of Isolation In Economics’,
Dilworth C. (ed) Intelligibility in Science IV, Rodophi.
Pratten S. (1999) ‘The “Closure”
Assumption as a First Step’, in S. Fleetwood (ed) Critical Realism in Economics;
Development and Debate, Routledge.
Runde J. (1998) ‘Assessing Causal Economic
Explanations’, Oxford Economic
Papers No. 50, pp 151-172
Sayer A. (1998) ‘Abstraction: A Realist
Interpretation’, M. Archer, R. Bhaskar, A.
Collier, T. Lawson, A. Norrie, (eds)
Critical Realism: Essential Readings,
Routledge
Sweezy P. (1968) Theory Of Capitalist Development, Modern Reader.
_________________________
SUGGESTED CITATION:
Steve Fleetwood, "Why Neoclassical Economics Explains Nothing
At ”, post-autistic economics review,
issue no. 17, December 4, 2002, article 2. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue17.htm
Defining "Economics" Inclusively
Tony Aspromourgos (University of Sydney,
Australia)
In following the
contributions and debates in this Review
it has struck me that there is a need for a definition of economics which is wider and more inclusive than
the old Wicksteed-inspired formula articulated by
Lionel Robbins, in terms of the allocation of scarce means to inexhaustible
purposes. By the very terms of its
constitution, this definition tends towards defining the discipline as marginalist. That is to say, it tends naturally to the
normative inference that orthodox economics is (the only legitimate) economics. Any definition of more
generality should be concise, constitutive and programmatic. I offer the
following for consideration: In the most general terms, economics is the study of how
societies organize the production and distribution of the means of human
sustenance and larger consumption. This is constitutive and
programmatic in the sense that it defines a proper domain for the discipline
– and points to a desirable set of research programmes which ought to be undertaken.
Its inclusiveness – or, if one prefers, its expansiveness
– should be evident. The classical-Marxian orientation towards material
reproduction and distribution, with the price system as a conduit for the
associated allocation of commodities, fits naturally into this definition.
Keynesianism (and hence also the effective demand dimension of Kalecki) can be articulated within its domain – as
a theory of how, in certain kinds of political societies, there may be no
spontaneous mechanism to ensure an optimal level of resource utilization, and
hence sub-optimal activity levels and consumption outcomes occur. The
evolution of social organization and institutions also finds a natural place,
as the study of how the politico-social mechanisms for effecting consumption
have varied. Hence those associated with the Historical School, evolutionary
economics and Institutionalism find a legitimate place.
My definition also avoids the asocial orientation of marginalism by
taking its point of departure from social organization, rather than from
independent individuals. Furthermore, it embraces the study of current, past,
or even future (including ‘ideal’), societies. Hence it does not
discriminate against economic history – economic history is included in
a natural way in the definition, as well as economic anthropology and
economic sociology. (The discipline definitely would be better off if some of
the resources currently devoted to theorizing were redeployed to historical
studies. There is too much of the former and far too little of the latter.)
The study of ‘ideal’ societies points to normative analysis
– in orthodox language, welfare economics – though of course,
non-orthodox welfare economics need not only proceed on such a grand scale.
If it is felt that nature and the natural environment should be
more explicit in the definition, then ‘extraction,’ could be
inserted before ‘production’ in the definition. In fact, the
focus on ‘sustenance’ is suggestive of sustainability – and
indeed, the classical focus on reproduction of social economies is, at core,
a notion of sustainability (including scarcity of an objective kind, rather
than the subjective marginalist form).
The definition offered here might also have the effect of
orienting the various, current subdisciplines of
economics more towards the final, human, material purpose of economic
systems. This need not in all respects involve radical departure from
conventional thinking. Hence, for example, the theory of finance has as its
purpose the study of instruments and systems for enabling the intertemporal shifting of consumption. This is not a
heterodox proposition, even if participants in financial analysis often lose
sight of this ultimate (legitimate) social purpose of financial systems.
Consumption is not the ultimate
human purpose of course; but beyond survival, the purposes consumption serves
seem not to be something economics can say anything very significant about.
Certainly orthodox economics has offered little beyond empirically empty
nonsense-tautologies like ‘utility’ and ‘preference’.
(Why not just say ‘people are what they are’ and be done with
it!) The referring of consumption demand back to deeper underlying
characteristics of commodities may be
a fruitful way towards saying more.
From the standpoint of my suggested definition of economics, the
marginalist approach then appears as the study of
the distribution or allocation of a given set of resources to the achievement
of (some of) a given set of possible (ranked) uses. Hence my definition does
not, and does not seek to, exclude orthodox economics – it rather
locates it as one approach, to one particular kind of question, in a larger
and more general context.
Or perhaps it does exclude one dimension of the marginalist intellectual project in its widest form: the
idea that its method (constrained individual optimization, with or without
strategic interaction) can be a general theory of human psychology and choice
as such – hence the idea that
it can explain getting married, having children, going to war, committing
suicide, and so on. By orienting the subject matter towards
‘economics’ in the common
sense of that term, my definition marginalizes (pun intended) these
pretensions. Get back to the study of ‘guns and butter’ (or, in a
classical vein, machine tools and corn) boys and girls! ‘It’s the
economy, stupid’ – indeed.
_________________________
SUGGESTED CITATION:
Tony Aspromourgos, “Defining 'Economics' Inclusively”, post-autistic
economics review, issue no. 17,
December 4, 2002, article 3. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue17.htm
Beautiful Mind,
Ugly Deception:
The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economics Science1
Yves
Gingras (Univerité du Quebec ŕ Montéal)
Much has been said about the
Oscar-winning movie A Beautiful Mind and its hero, the mathematician John
Nash. Just as spring is the time for Oscars, a new crop of Nobel prizes has
accompanied the fall of autumn leaves every October since 1901. As Daniel Kahneman and Vernon L. Smith share an award this year,
it’s a good time to pose a question raised by a neglected aspect of the
movie: what prize exactly did Nash really win?
The
answer is not as obvious as it seems. When A Beautiful Mind hit our screens,
one correspondent to an entertainment weekly pointed out that the
‘Nobel Prize in Mathematics’ he had read about did not actually
exist. Many will recall the brief scene in the movie when the young Nash
– suffering from lack of recognition of his true genius – remarks
to his MIT colleagues that he has been robbed of the ‘Fields
Medal’. What is that? Ask any mathematician, and he will tell you:
‘this is the equivalent of the Nobel prize for mathematicians’.
Established in 1936, it is given once every four years to no more than four
exceptional mathematicians under 40 years of age.
The incident confirms that John Nash,
in coveting this most prestigious prize in the mathematics community, was at
that point still rooted in reality. In contrast, though the story of a man
from Stockholm waiting for Nash after his class to share the good news that
he had won a prize is confirmed, it is doubtful that the prize itself was
real. Or so I will claim.
The currency is prestige
Which ‘Nobel prize’ was
the man from Stockholm talking about? Most journalists (and every economist)
will of course answer, the ‘Nobel Prize in Economics’ –
even though it is never specified in the movie. Against this
taken-for-granted ‘fact’, I am arguing here that this prize does
not exist: and moreover, that this so-called ‘Nobel prize’ is an
extraordinary case study in the successful transformation of economic capital
into symbolic capital, a transformation which greatly inflates the symbolic
power of the discipline of Economics in the public mind.
The confusion can be traced back to
1968 when the governor of the Central Bank of Sweden decided to mark the
tercentenary of that institution by creating a new award. It could have been
named after a well-known ancestral economist, such as Adam Smith, or more
simply, though unimaginatively, ‘The Bank of Sweden Prize in
Economics’. After all, every discipline has its own
‘prestigious’ prize. Their number grows every year. However, the
problem is that all these prizes, though well known within the microcosms of
their discipline, have little public appeal. Only the Nobel prizes have a
real public impact. But they are limited to five fields: physics, chemistry,
physiology and medicine, literature and, finally, peace.
Moreover, the enormous symbolic
capital of the very name ‘Nobel prize’ has been accumulated over
the years by a careful selection of prizewinners.
Like every new prize, by definition unknown, the Nobel faced the problem of
what we can call (invoking Pierre Bourdieu’s
apt concept) the ‘primitive accumulation of symbolic capital’.
This obstacle was overcome by giving the prize early on to already renowned
scientists who would bring the prize real credibility. The idea was that,
over the years, this symbolic capital would surely accrue to such an extent
that it could in turn bring recognition to the chosen winners.
The organisers, conscious of this
conundrum and wishing to endow the discipline of economics with as much
public credibility as possible, decided to call the prize: ‘The Bank of
Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel’. Curiously
then, it was the memory of Nobel, not that of an economist, that was being
recalled. This mystery can be explained if we unpack the process crystallised
in that bizarre and awkward name.
First, despite the scepticism of some
scientists towards the ‘scientificity’
of economics, the Bank managed to convince the Royal Swedish Academy of
Sciences and the Nobel Foundation to administer their prize. Secondly, identical
procedures for the selection and nomination of the prize were chosen to those
of the real Nobel prizes. Of course, the prize money would come from the Bank
of Sweden, not the Nobel Foundation, but all the rest would be done exactly
as if it was in fact a Nobel prize, up to and including the ceremony of 10
December.
Thus, the inclusion of the term
‘in Honor of Alfred Nobel’ in the title
created the necessary bridge to the Nobel prize, and by exactly mimicking the
process, the Bank created all the conditions enabling the association and
even the identification of its prize with those established by Alfred Nobel
at the turn of the century. Note that, for obvious reasons, it is much
simpler to say ‘Nobel Prize in Economics’ than ‘Bank of
Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Honor of
Alfred Nobel’! No surprise that, since 1969, all journalists and
economists have commonly referred to the Bank of Sweden Prize as ‘The
Nobel Prize in Economics’. The strategy was a complete success.
The
social alchemy of belief
Now that we understand why a bizarre
name was chosen, transforming a peculiar social alchemy into a ‘Nobel
prize’, let us look at the ‘flow of capital’ the whole
process involved. The Bank started with economic capital and ‘invested’
it in the Nobel Foundation to transform it into symbolic capital as fast as
possible. Even a very large amount of cash is not sufficient in itself to
assure the prestige of a prize. The key point was to effect a complete
transfer of the already accumulated symbolic capital of the Nobel prizes to
the new Economic Prize instituted by the Bank. Any other strategy would have
been more risky given the difficulty, uncertainty and time lag attending any
primitive accumulation of symbolic capital. In other words, this history makes
visible the well-managed transformation of economic into symbolic capital,
thus confirming Bourdieu’s theory of the
convertibility of the basic kinds of capital (economic, social, cultural and
symbolic).
Of course, many will say: ‘We
all know it is the Bank of Sweden Prize, but it is much simpler to say
“Nobel Prize”.’ In point of fact, the Nobel website is
careful to make the distinction, thus habitually announcing the ‘2002
Nobel Prizes and the Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel’. But this argument is either naive or disingenuous. For the
success of the strategy of creating a ‘Nobel by association’ has
obvious social consequences.
As anyone knows, the attribution of a
Nobel prize gives instant world fame to the winners, who become oracles
commenting on anything journalists can fathom: war, peace, philosophy,
environment, irrespective of their particular fields of expertise.
Interestingly, there is a strong correlation between the dates of attribution
of a Nobel prize and the subsequent publication of memoirs or opinionated
books by Nobel Laureates. This is a socio-logical consequence of the fact
that the legitimacy bestowed by the Nobel prize is rapidly put to use in the
public space to voice ideas that the winner would not have dared to submit
were he or she a ‘simple scientist’.
Whereas the ‘spontaneous’
philosophy or sociology of scientists can be considered relatively harmless,
the situation is quite different in economics. By its annual offer of a
public image of ‘hard science’ through its association with the
Nobel prizes, the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences gives the
discipline and its laureates the ‘scientific’ aura it lacked to
put forward authoritative but often simplistic theories about the economy (or,
worse, the whole society) conceived as a big ‘market’ where
everything can be submitted to the so-called ‘law of demand’
– be it a house, a wedding, or even an idea.
What is even more fascinating is that
the social alchemy which transmuted the Bank of Sweden prize into a Nobel
prize, affected not only the general public (via its media coverage of
course) but the members of the discipline and even the winners themselves,
who are convinced they have won a real ‘Nobel Prize in
Economics’. Thus, James Buchanan (1986 prize) offers the readers his
“Notes on Nobelity”. Before him, Paul
Samuelson (1970 winner) wrote about his ‘Nobel coronation’
– not his ‘Bank of Sweden Coronation’ – and filled
his talk with references to Einstein (4 times) Bohr (2 times) and eight other
winners of the (real) physics Nobel prize (not to mention, of course, Newton)
plus a few other names names as if he were part of
this familly. Curiously there is not a single
economist named in this talk. A simple counterfactual gedanken
experiment (as physicists like to call these thought experiments) makes
it easy to understand that such a talk would have been impossible had the
prize been called “The Adam Smith Prize of Economics” and
accompanied with a Million dollar check.
As for the discipline – in a
move typical of the pushy newcomer – it markets with ostentation its
(false) membership in the Nobel club by publishing books, such as Lives of
the Laureates: Seven Nobel Economists (1986 and carefully updated to
‘Ten’ in 1990), which promote the discipline by associating it
with the Nobel prize, a practice not observed in the scientific fields
covered in the will of Alfred Nobel.
It would seem that engineers,
frustrated not to have a Nobel of their own, have also approached the Nobel
Foundation to create one, only to be told that, in order not to dilute the
prestige of the Nobel prize, there should not be any more. Though the effect
of scarcity applies to the value of economic as well as symbolic capital, the
credibility of the Foundation may already be affected by association with the
Bank of Sweden and the economists. Having played an important role in
lobbying the Swedish Academy of Sciences to accept the Bank’s offer and
after having himself received the prize, Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal changed his mind
and became a fierce advocate of the abolition of the prize. More recently, a
few days before the Nobel ceremony of the 2001 prizes, descendants of Alfred
Nobel criticized the used of the term “Nobel prize” applied to
economics. Peter Nobel, a great-grandnephew of Nobel told journalists
that his familly is “asking for a clear distinction
between the original Nobel prizes and this (prize)”. True to economic
“laws” (or maybe ironic…) he noted that the actual use of
the name “is like an intrusion in the trademark”! (See Chronicle
of Higher Education, December 7 2001).
Though this suggestion may be
considered extreme by many (not me), it is clear that there are now many people
coming to the conclusion that the institutions involved made a mistake in
associating themselves with this symbolic coup d’Etat
in the ‘Republic of Science’ – a move aimed at enforcing
the dominant status of economics as a ‘hard’ science not only among
the disciplines of the social sciences, but first and foremost in the mind of
the public and its elected representatives.
In his classic book How to Do
Things with Words, philosopher John Austin, explained that words not only
describe the world but create it through their performative
aspect. Those of us who want to resist the symbolic violence inherent in the
usurpation of the “Nobel Prizes” by economists and do
something against this annual propaganda can begin by calling the prize by
its real name: The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Science”. They can
also correct systematically those who still persist in talking about the
“Nobel prize in Economics”. Where the mere repetition of words
has contributed to the “reality” of that prize in the public mind,
it is not impossible that a systematic counter-attack could deconstruct this
chimera propagated my media and idolized by economists.
Note: An
earlier version of this article appeared on www.opendemocracy.net.
_____________________
SUGGESTED CITATION:
Yves Gingras, “Beautiful
Mind, Ugly Deception: The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economics
Science”, post-autistic economics review, issue no. 17, December
4, 2002, article 4. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue17.htm
In Defence of Amartya Sen
Ingrid
Robeyns (University
of Amsterdam, Netherlands)
In Issue 15 of the Post-Autistic Economics Review, Emmanuelle Benicourt (2002) argues that Amartya
Sen’s capability approach remains
“undeniably neoclassical”, and is “just a variation of
standard microeconomics”. She
also categorizes Sen as a traditional mainstream
economist. I wish to explain why I believe that these views are fundamentally
mistaken.
The capability approach reconsidered
Sen’s capability
approach has its roots both in welfare economics (Sen
1985, 1987), where it was the logical extension of his earlier work on the
informational poverty of utilitarian calculus (e.g. Sen
1979), as well as in the philosophical literature on inequality (1980), where
it was proposed as an alternative to both the utilitarian and the resourcist paradigms. The capability approach advocates
that in making evaluations of well-being or policies, we focus on what people
can do and be, instead of exclusively on their mental states (utilitarianism)
or on the goods that they have at their disposal (resourcism).
Over time, Sen and others have extended the scope
of the capability approach to study such divers issues as development and
development ethics (Gasper 1997, Sen 1999), the
evaluation of small-scale NGO-projects (Alkire
2002), eating disorders and famines (Lavaque-Manty
2001), unemployment and inactivity (Burchardt
2002), gender inequality in western societies (Robeyns
2002), to mention just a few. At this moment PhD students are using the
capability framework to study topics such as well-being of disabled people,
environmental law and climate change, and the impact of a financial crisis on
people’s well-being. The Human Development Report, which is
currently (one of) the strongest alternative frameworks to the neoliberalist “Washington consensus”, is
largely based on the normative foundations of Sen’s
capability approach. In other words, the capability approach has gradually
developed into a paradigm, which moves between and beyond existing
disciplines, and which is applied in many more domains than only welfare
economics or liberal philosophy.
Is the capability approach just mainstream economics?
Does
the capability approach make a difference with a standard mainstream economic
analysis of these issues? I think that the existing work in the capability
paradigm strongly suggest that it does. Some examples can illustrate
this.
Sabina Alkire (2002) showed, based on fieldwork in
Pakistan, that a cost-benefit evaluation that only focuses on material
(financial) change, will not capture the changes in a number of important
capabilities, such as self-respect. NGO projects that are not viable from a
narrow economistic point of view may lead to many
non-material beneficial changes in poor people’s lives.
Tania
Burchardt (2002) developed a method to measure a
person’s capability for employment, instead of their achieved
functioning (thus their real opportunity to hold a job, instead of the
job-holding itself). By applying that method to British panel data, she can
empirically distinguish between those who do not hold a job because they do
not have a real opportunity to hold one, and those who do not hold a job
although they could have one if they wished so. As Burchardt
concludes, measuring employment capability would be more adequate than
relying upon standard unemployment statistics.
In
my own PhD-dissertation (Robeyns 2002), I first
theoretically analysed (and empirically illustrated) why mainstream economics
is fundamentally unsuited to study over-all gender inequality in well-being.
A capability perspective, in contrast, allows us to see ambiguities and
complexities that a pure utility- or income based analysis cannot reveal. For
example, while women in western societies are worse off than men in many
dimensions, there are also strong suggestions that men fare worse with
respect to interpersonal relations and social support. ‘Emancipation’
then becomes much less an issue of getting women into jobs, but more
radically about abolishing gender as we know it.
Reinventing the wheel?
Of
course, it is often argued that ultimately the capability approach is doing
the work that sociologists and other social scientists have been doing for
ages. I agree that much of the work that is done in other social sciences is
very similar to analyses that are done in the capability framework. However,
a crucial distinction is that the capability approach gives a consistent
normative framework to place these scattered studies, thus providing a sort
of theoretical umbrella for existing empirical work. Moreover, the capability
approach makes it theoretically very clear how different dimensions, such as
commodities, observable outcomes and unobservable opportunities are related.
Empirical and theoretical work, or micro and macro work, thus become much
more connected. In addition, because of its inter- or post-disciplinary
character, the capability approach offers a framework in which scholars and
policy makers from different disciplines can easily meet.
This
inter- or post-disciplinary character of the capability approach is one of
its most interesting aspects. In my opinion, most fields in economics are
more connected to related fields in other social sciences or the humanities,
than to other fields in economics. The capability approach offers a paradigm
for those utopian idealists who are dreaming of breaking down the walls
between the disciplines and to do research and teaching based on topics and
links between fields, instead of disciplinary assumptions and methodologies.
Of
course, all this does not imply that the capability approach cannot
substantially be improved or refined, or that it is completely ready to deliver;
therefore much more work needs to be done – work that is currently
undertaken by scholars across the disciplines, including many economists.
Sen’s
support for economists outside the neoclassical mainstream
Amartya Sen’s work is extremely wide-ranging. Some of his
work might be labelled mainstream-like because of its highly mathematical
character. But few of these articles model behaviour; instead, most are about
measurement or social choice. I doubt that this work should even be labelled
neoclassical, because Sen has criticised many core
neoclassical assumptions, like exclusively self-interested behaviour or the
dogma of optimisation. In addition, Sen has written
scores of articles that are definitely non-mainstream. And although he has spoken of himself as a
“mainstream” economist, he has added that for him that mainstream
is economics in the tradition of Joan Robinson, Marx, Kaldor
and so forth. Thus, when Sen calls himself a mainstream economist, he is trying to
rescue economics from the narrow-minded, imperialist discipline that it has
become.
I
think we must make a firm distinction between an economist who is a
traditional mainstream economist, and those who, from time to time, use
neoclassical mainstream tools. Moreover, we should not fear or condemn
economists who use mainstream tools (1) if they have a positive encouraging
attitude towards non-neoclasscial economists, and
(2) if they do not try to dominate them, for example, by only giving jobs to
mainstream economists or by refusing on methodological grounds to publish
articles of other persuasions. Sen cannot be
accused of any of this. Sen has done much to make
economics more inclusive for economists with non-traditional views, and has
given much personal support to such economists and their organisations (see
also Fine 2001). He is, for example, a patron of the Cambridge Journal of
Economics, and has given much support to the International Association
for Feminist Economics and its journal. On a personal note I want
to add that when I was his PhD-student he actively encouraged me to do what I
believed in, without being straightjacket by disciplinary or methodological
requirements – a situation that many contemporary economics PhD
students can only dream of.
Using Sen’s
work to develop an alternative economics
In
recent months, several authors in the Post-Autistic Economics Review have argued that we need to focus our
attention on trying to develop an alternative economics. I believe that much
of the constructive work that has to be done can potentially benefit from Sen’s work. Or, to use Ben Fine’s (2001: 12)
words:
“[Sen] has not been captured by economics
imperialism and, unlike its practitioners, he opens and is open to debate
across key issues. The contrast with mainstream economics is sharp, where the
language let alone the ideas necessary for a genuine political economy of
capitalism are precluded by its reductionism. Ultimately, the nature and
extent of Sen’s lasting contribution will
depend upon taking his work forward critically rather than allowing it to be
captured and transformed by the dismal science. Political economy may not
always be able to stand on Sen’s shoulders in
the coming period, but he certainly provides many weapons in addressing the
social, the macro, the material, and the cultural in the intellectual battles
that lie ahead in defining the “economic” for social
science.”
Indeed, it
would be a capital mistake not to regard Sen and
his work as an ally in our struggle to open up economics, even if Sen himself prefers not to jump on the barricades, but to
provide us with some fundamental concepts and tools that can be used to
provide the hard-needed alternative.
eferences
Alkire, Sabina (2002). Valuing Freedoms. Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction,
Oxford University
Press.
Emmanuelle Benicourt, “Is Amartya Sen a Post-Autistic Economist?”, post-autistic economics review, issue no.
15, September 4, 2002, article
4. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue15.htm
Burchardt, Tania (2002). “Constraint and
Opportunity: Women’s Employment in Britain”, paper presented at
the
conference on promoting women’s capabilities,
Cambridge, 9-10 September 2002.
Fine, Ben (2001). “Amartya Sen: A Partial and Personal Appreciation”, London, SOAS: CDPR Discussion Paper
1601.
Gasper, Des (1997), “Sen’s Capability
Approach and Nussbaum’s Capability Ethics”, Journal of
International
Development,
9/2, 281-302.
Lavaque-Manty Myka (2001)
“Food, Functioning and Justice: From Famines to Eating
Disorders”, Journal of
Political Philosophy, 9/2
150-167.
Robeyns, Ingrid (2002), Gender Inequality. A
Capability Perspective. PhD-thesis, Cambridge University.
Sen, Amartya (1979)
“Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: What’s wrong with
Welfare Economics?”,
Economic Journal, 89,
pp. 537-558.
____ (1980) “Equality of What?” in: S. McMurrin
(ed.) Tanner lectures on Human Values, Vol
1, Cambridge
University Press.
____ (1985). Commodities and Capabilities, Amsterdam, North Holland.
____ (1987). The Standard of Living, Cambridge University Press.
____ (1999) Development as Freedom. Knopf publishers.
_______________________
Ingrid Robeyns (irobeyns@fmg.uva.nl) was one of the
authors of the Cambridge 27 proposal, “Opening Up Economics”. She
is now a post-doctoral research fellow at the University of Amsterdam,
working on the capability approach and the welfare state.
_______________________
SUGGESTED CITATION:
Ingrid Robeyns, “In
Defence of Amartya Sen, post-autistic economics review, issue
no. 17, December 4, 2002, article 5. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue17.htm
Economics
Outside the (Edgeworth) Box
Robert Scott Gassler (Vrije Universiteit
Brussel, Belgium)
Away from Autism
A couple of years ago I went to a European conference on
heterodox economics, and I made three mistakes. First, I wore a blue suit.
Second, I admitted to the session chairperson that I was from Texas. Waco,
even. Third, within the first two minutes I accidentally said something about
neoclassical economics that fell short of a complete condemnation. The
audience fried me. Next year I plan to go again. I’ll wear a tweed
jacket with no tie, I’ll tell everyone I was born in Ohio (which is
true), and I’ll start by trashing neoclassical theory big time.
To avoid that problem here, I shall state my position as clearly
as I know how. Pluralism is good; too much mathematics is bad. Any decent
doctoral program should include methodology, history of economic thought,
economic history, and plenty of heterodox theory. I was one of the first three
signers of the PAE petition in Belgium.
What should we keep
from neoclassical economics?
After twelve years as an American teaching in Belgium, I have
developed a great appreciation not only of Belgian culture in particular and
European culture in general, but also of the things about America that I
think are worth emulating in the rest of the world. Interestingly, they are
not at all the things that others might think. By the same token, I believe
that there are certain things worth keeping from neoclassical economics, but
they are not at all what others have listed in this journal.
The most important thing about neoclassical economics is that it
has developed a relatively complete set of categories which can be used to classify
concepts and facilitate communication with other disciplines. The fact that
these particular concepts are undervalued by neoclassical economists whose
communication with other disciplines is notorious for its one-sidedness is no
reason to throw them out.
From Walras and others at the turn of
the last century, under the influence of the logical positivists, is the
threefold categorization of positive economics, normative economics, and
applied economics. It is important to distinguish the first two precisely
because they are so easily conflated and virtually impossible to disentangle.
Positive economics is invariably subjective (which is not the same as
normative: astronomers of any value orientation can see other parts of the
universe only from our location and their time). It is also infused with
values from the time a researcher chooses what variables to measure to the
time he or she draws “policy implications.” In order to make
progress in determining what the universe is like, however, we must do what
we can to avoid seeing only what we want to see due to our values.
The distinction between theory and “empirics” should
be maintained for similar reasons, though pedagogically it may be better to
mix them as they do in the natural sciences. We should perhaps avoid telling
our students that an earlier meaning of the term “empirical” was
“fraudulent”. We should however note that the most zealous
guardians of the inner core of neoclassical theory (located in Chicago,
Illinois, not Cambridge, Massachusetts) refer to themselves as
“empirical economists”.
The important thing for both theory and empirics is to be
pluralistic. For theory the meaning has been discussed extensively in this
journal. For empirics it means taking
an interest in techniques not taught in econometrics courses. For example, my
old micro professor dismissed survey research with an apocryphal anecdote:
someone once asked CEOs whether they maximize
profits, and they said no, we also look to help the community. Then they
asked whether the CEOs could be doing more to make
money, and they said no, they were doing all they could. End of story. He
neglected to mention that virtually all the statistics used for
number-crunching are based on data gathered by surveys.
From the field of industrial economics, we should adopt the
concepts of structure, conduct (or behavior),
performance, and practice. The latter is called “policy” in the
literature, but “practice” includes firms and other
nongovernmental actors. Never mind the esoteric debate over whether causality
runs from left to right or whether we can skip any of the steps in between:
the universe is complex and causality is mutual and simultaneous. Get used to
it.
From public economics, we should keep the distinction among the
economic activities of government developed by Musgrave: allocation of
resources (public goods, externalities, imperfect competition, social rates
of discount, excessive risk), distribution of income, and macroeconomic
stabilization. Do not yield to the temptation to use the word
“function” instead of “activity” for fear of inducing
unnecessary debate by sociologists and even biologists. To complete the list,
we should add the two used in the underrated theory of economic systems: the
natural and societal environment (taste, technology, resources) and the
economic system itself (ownership, economic information, transactions).
Together these constitute as close to a mutually exclusive and
exhaustive set of categories as anyone would want in as complex a subject as
this. One wants an open-ended science, like biological taxonomy or library
classification. Therefore too much rigidity is bad, as is the construction of
a closed system, even if a taxonomic one. But so is too much confusion.
A Suggested
Framework
The whole scheme would fit together in a
systematic way, while leaving room for miscellany and growth in unexpected
directions. (I elaborated on this in Gassler, 1998)
It helps us if we were to draw analogies with the pure and applied biological
sciences; these are given in parentheses. It also helps us make sense of the
suggested curriculum for economics proposed here earlier (“Two
Curricula,” 2000). These are indicated in quotation marks.
Structure (positive, analogous to anatomy) “Descriptive economics: history of economic and social phenomena,
actors and institutions”
- The
natural and social environment: tastes, technology, and resources.
- The
economic system itself: the rules of ownership, the pattern of economic
information, costs of different transactions.
Conduct or Behavior (positive,
analogous to physiology)
- The
allocation of resources, including: public goods and externalities,
coordination (through market or nonmarket
means under perfect or imperfect competition), choice over time, risk
and uncertainty.
- The
distribution of income: in cash or in kind.
- Macroeconomic
stabilization: employment, prices, growth.
Performance (positive in using performance measures; normative
in choosing which ones to use; analogous to pathology when used to mean the study
of disease) “Applied
economics and quantitative methods; economic and social policies”
Criteria that correspond roughly to the categories given above:
efficiency, equity, stability for the last three, things like
“propriety” or “information symmetry” for the others.
Practice
(applied, analogous to clinical medicine) “Theories and issues”
Corporate strategy, nonprofit
strategy, government policy, etc. This is the purview of the professional
schools: business, international affairs, law, library and information
science, nonprofit administration, public
administration, social work.
Arrow-Debreu and the fundamental
theorems of welfare economics are a rather simple special case of positive
and normative economics, a fact not lost on Arrow, Debreu,
and others. Assume maximization of exogenous tastes, exogenous technology,
fixed resources, private ownership, full information, costless transactions,
no public goods or externalities, parametric prices (which some say could
mean competitive equilibrium), no social discount rate, and no excessive
risk, and the allocation of resources is efficient for whatever equitable or
lopsided distribution your economic model started with. The Edgeworth boxes “prove” it. Stabilization is
automatic, since everything runs smoothly. Performance is perfect.
Application is impossible. This is worth a week or two in class sometime in
an economic student’s career in order to show how neoclassical theory
fits together and to show how silly it is for economists to be flippant about
things like free trade.
To be sure, the neoclassical model has been amended and extended
to relax some of the assumptions in each category; whole fields of economics
have been started that way. But the fun part comes in when we look at the
heterodox approaches. Most of them attack on all fronts, but as a first
approximation some of their attacks are stronger in certain categories. For
example, the assumptions about tastes have been attacked by several schools:
feminist (attacking the assumptions of exogeneity
and selfishness), behavioral (attacking
maximization), and humanistic and socio-economics (attacking the assumption
that all things enter preferences the same way). The Marxist and
Post-Keynesian schools attack the assumptions underlying neoclassical
theories of stabilization (macroeconomics). Of course Marxist, evolutionary,
and institutional economics go way beyond the list, but that fact should be
stressed in order to keep us from thinking the list is a closed system, not
in order to discard the list.
Conclusion
To restate my position: neoclassical economics, especially
mathematical neoclassical economics, is okay if you do not take it too
seriously. It should be only a small part of the economics of the
twenty-first century. If you think that makes me anything other than a
post-autistic economist, then I’ll swat you with my tweed jacket.
References
Gassler, Robert Scott, "The
Theory of Political and Social Economics: Beyond the Neoclassical
Perspective,"
Journal of
Interdisciplinary Economics, Vol. 9, No.2, 1998, pp.93-124.
“Two Curricula: Chicago vs. PAE, Post-Autistic
Economics Newsletter, Issue no. 4, article 3”; 29
January 2000.
_____________________
SUGGESTED CITATION:
Robert Scott Gassler, “Economics Outside the (Edgeworth) Box”, post-autistic economics review, issue
no. 17, December 4, 2002, article 6. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue17.htm
Need Efficiency – and Much More!
A
response to Richard Wolff
Grischa Perino (University College London,
UK)
Richard Wolff1 attacks the
concept of efficiency and the related tool of cost-benefit analysis, first
for being based on false assumptions about the nature of the world and second
as an instrument which enforces hegemonies of one social group over another.
He doesn’t clearly reveal what he wants to change. (Or maybe I just
haven’t got the point.) It is nevertheless obvious that he dislikes the
status quo. However he doesn’t say whether he wants to get rid of all
cost-benefit analysis because it fails to incorporate the infinite
interdependency of the world or whether he just wants to emphasise the
subjectivity of this kind of analysis. This makes all the difference.
Before I explain why I think the
first option is dangerous but the second very important, let me summarise his reasoning.
Richard Wolff says that from an “overdeterminist”
view of the world, “any one act, event, or institution has an infinity
of effects now and into the future” and vice versa that “each of
such effects actually had an infinity of causative influences”. He
concludes that it is impossible to undertake a complete analysis of all
positive and negative effects of any policy. Cost-benefit analyses are
therefore by their nature selective. Different social groups struggle against
each other to gain the power to define the set of effects (and therefore
interests) included in the process of evaluating different policies. The
group who wins this fight sets its own definition of efficiency as an
absolute measure and imposes a hegemony over the rest of society.
I share his view that our world is
much more complex than any kind of cost-benefit analysis can ever cover. But
is this a legitimate basis of critique? I think it is not. From my point of
view there is no concept or tool which could deal with the full richness of
our world. Each and every attempt to invent such a tool has to fail. That is
because all our thinking about the world is by its nature incomplete: and so
are all the models we create to explain what is going on around us and what
will happen if we do or don’t do anything. (Just to avoid
misunderstandings, the term model covers much more than the funny mathematical
things used in economics textbooks. Each and every kind of thought about the
world builds up some kind of model which relates causes and effects in a more
or less incomplete way.) This is a mess, but this is the only way we can deal
with our imperfect human state situated in a mind-bogglingly complex
environment. So we have to be selective when we evaluate policies. This is
nobody’s fault. It is a simple result of living in a constrained world.
As it is impossible to develop a tool
which predicts the ‘true’ effects of any policy on the agenda, it
is pointless to claim that a particular tool is inappropriate because it
fails to do so. There may be a lot of reasons to criticise the concepts of
efficiency and cost-benefit analysis, but being limited in scope and
therefore selective isn’t one of them.
It is not only pointless but
dangerous to use this kind of criticism. As there is no instrument of policy
evaluation which satisfies this condition, the call for tools which
aren’t selective is equivalent to saying that there should be no policy
evaluation at all: but in my opinion there is nothing more dangerous than
arbitrariness.
It is nevertheless most important to
keep in mind that all evaluations of policies are limited and selective,
because it follows that no single tool could claim to tell the truth. Each
and every analysis ignores some causes and effects and therefore interests.
Richard Wolff is right in concluding that the implementation of one single
instrument leads to a systematic bias towards particular interests and the
exclusion of others. But how can we avoid building a hegemony without falling
back to arbitrariness? The solution relies on two features. We need rich and
diverse branches of social sciences (among them economics) which offer many different
instruments and apply them to evaluate policies. After an open discussion
which should aim to reveal the different values behind the analyses, the
decision on which policy is chosen should be up to a democratic process. In
my opinion there is no better way to take into account both the limits of our
ability and the necessity to evaluate policies.
The aim of the post-autistic
movement, to demand diversity in economics teaching and research, is
therefore the best thing I can think of.
Note
1. Richard Wolff, Efficiency: Whose Efficiency, Post-Autistic Economics Review, issue
no. 16, September 16, 2002, article 3.
Available at: http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue16.htm
______________________
SUGGESTED CITATION:
Grischa Perino, “Need
Efficiency – and Much More! A Response to Richard Wolf”, post-autistic economics review, issue
no. 17, December 4, 2002, article 7. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue17.htm
___________________________________________________________________________________________
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