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Symposium on
Reorienting Economics (Part VI) Dialogue on the reform of economics
with Tony Lawson’s Reorienting Economics as focal point (Un)Real Criticism
©
Copyright: David R. Ruccio 2005 Reading the work of Tony
Lawson and the growing literature on critical realism and economics, I am
impressed by the power of this “underlaboring”
philosophy both to shed light on the methodological problems that beset
contemporary mainstream economics and to help create the theoretical space in
which we, as heterodox economists, can imagine and develop alternatives to
the mainstream. At the same time, I am troubled by the particular way Lawson
and other critical realists are endeavoring to fill
that space. Let me put this a different
way: Lawson and other critical realists raise a series of pertinent and
probing questions concerning the ontological presuppositions of contemporary
economic discourse. I am not, however, persuaded by the specific answers
Lawson and others give to those questions. I want to use this essay,
then, to explain why I think critical realism—at least Lawson’s version of
it, as spelled out in Reorienting
Economics—deserves a great deal of credit for challenging mainstream
economics and recognizing the value of heterodox economics, all in the name
of “reality.” In this, Lawson has established the ground for a new set of
conversations in and about economics. He asks those of us who labor in the discipline of economics to become
self-conscious about the conceptual schemes and methods we use when we take
on the task of analyzing one or another aspect of reality and how those
methods are inextricably related to issues of ontology, to how we understand
the nature of being. Of particular significance to me, since I have never
been much convinced by the ontological schemes presumed within mainstream
(neoclassical and Keynesian) economics, Lawson’s critical realism asks those
of us who do heterodox economics to discuss and debate the general role that
reality plays in our work and the particular conceptions of reality with
which we conduct our work. How do we conceive of social reality and the
relations between the various parts of that reality? What are the notions of
subjectivity and identity we deploy in our analyses? What is the relationship
between economic discourse and social reality? Instead of ignoring such
questions, critical realism places them front and center,
and in this has enlivened the conversations within and among the schools of
thought that today make up heterodox economics. I also want to argue that the
specific conception of reality put forward by Lawson forecloses another set
of conversations. In arguing that economic (and, more generally, social) analysis
requires a specific ontology—an independent reality characterized by
relations of depth between actual events, practices, and behaviors
and underlying rules, codes, and structures, and much more—critical realism
precludes a productive engagement with the constitutive effects of different
economic discourses. It also leaves unexamined the existence of
other—particularly, Marxian and postmodern—ontologies that have been developed and proven to be
quite useful in recent years. Economic
and Social Reality While in much of this essay I
adopt a critical stance toward Reorienting
Economics, I want to leave no doubt that I am quite sympathetic to a
great deal of Lawson’s work, and to critical realism more generally. And
that’s the case not only on strictly theoretical issues. In my view, credit
should also be given to Lawson for the ways he has opened his Routledge book series to perspectives other than those of
critical realism and the extent to which he has demonstrated, in contrast to
many other economic methodologists these days, an interest in and a clear
partisanship in favor of nonmainstream—feminist,
Post-Keynesian, institutionalist, and
other—approaches to economic analysis.1 My interest in and support for
Lawson’s version of critical realism runs through a number of other themes
and issues. For example, the extent to which the “ontological turn” brings
discussions of social reality back into economics can only have a salutary
effect. This is especially true since Lawson (as other critical realists)
avoids the kind of naïve empiricism that still pervades much economic
analysis, both mainstream and heterodox. (Generally but not always, an issue
to which I return below.) The complexity and “messiness” of reality remind
all of us that the theories we develop always leave something out; there is
always a “remainder,” which cannot simply be dismissed as unimportant or
extraneous to our analyses of history and society. The “fullness” of material
reality thus makes us suspicious of any attempt to derive a single order,
whether a Subject or an Origin, that can be said to govern or give rise
to—that can account for every dimension of—what we have before us. Invoking
reality in this way allows us to raise questions about, and to pose
alternatives to, both the theoretical models and policy prescriptions of our
mainstream counterparts.2 There is another sense in
which putting reality up front aids us in confronting mainstream economics
and elaborating our own approaches to economic analysis and policy. If our
conception of social reality is such that the economy is “open” with respect
to other social spheres and practices—such that, for example, economic events
and practices are affected by and spill over into culture, politics, and so
on, and no strict lines can be drawn between these areas—then the kinds of
theories and policies advocated by many mainstream economics, which presume a
more or less isolated economy, can be challenged. Two particular examples
might help to illustrate this point. Microeconomic analyses of decisionmaking often presume that individuals will make
rational decisions, unaffected by the “real” values (such as fairness and
justice) or knowledges (including whether or not a
decision is warranted or even possible) such agents hold. Similarly, if for a
particular country a mainstream economist conducts a macroeconomic analysis,
which uncovers an imbalance for which they propose a currency devaluation (or
some such measure) as the solution, “reality” tells us that those with little
or no power (women, workers, the unemployed, and so on) may be and often are
adversely affected by such a policy. In such cases, reality can be used to
complicate, undermine, and/or transform the usual pronouncements of
mainstream economists.3 But, of course, Lawson claims
more than that reality be brought to the forefront, that we confront head-on
the twin challenges of making sense of and intervening to change contemporary
social reality. He argues that the protocols of science require that reality
be conceived in a particular fashion. In this arena, too, I find much to
commend in his approach. A “social world structured by social rules or codes”
that is “continuously reproduced or transformed”; social practices that are
both “highly, and systematically,
segmented or differentiated” and
“constitutively other-oriented”; social reality as a “process” of
becoming; social agents that have consciousness who, at the same time, are
often engaged in “human doings that are carried out without being
premeditated or reflected upon”—these and other attributes of the ontology
elaborated by Lawson (in Economics and
Reality as well as in Reorienting
Economics) are exactly the kinds of things I emphasize in my research and
teaching (both inside and outside the university), in contrast to many of the
ways reality is depicted in and enforced by mainstream economics. Reality
and Science If Lawson stopped there, then
I would have not have cause to criticize his approach (except, perhaps, for
quibbles around the edges). But then his discussion of ontology wouldn’t
carry the force of critical realism. Because Lawson both wants to accord a
particular status to this ontology and, following on that, to attribute to it
a structure of “depth” or verticality. I (and I presume others) find both of
these arguments problematic. Lawson contends that ontology
is important because science demands it—and the particular ontology he
describes is said both to rule out the formalist protocols of mainstream
economics and to accord with his preferred “contrastive explanation” approach
to economic and social science. Once again, I find myself sympathetic with
the questioning (particularly of the fetishism of formal, including
mathematical, models) but not with the answer.4 For the approach
Lawson adopts is to develop a particular definition of the goals and methods
of science—to identify “event regularities,” to form causal hypotheses to
explain such regularities, and to choose between competing hypotheses—and
then to indicate what reality must look like in order to follow the protocols
of such a conception of science. The result is that, instead of
putting reality at the forefront, it is science—and a specific understanding
of science—that governs everything else. The ontological turn is, in the way
I read it, actually a turn to science. The emphasis on reality is further
undermined by Lawson’s frequent references to a kind of common sense as the
warrant for his assertions about reality. Reorienting
Economics is replete with such phrases as “we all act on it” (p. 33),
“highly generalized feature of experience” (p. 38), “we all, it seems have”
(p 46), and “generalized fact of experience” (pp. 51 and 85). Here, in an
approach eerily reminiscent of empiricism, the requirements of science
(reality must be structured in a specific way for science to work) are
shunted aside in favor of the shared observations
of the scientists (who are presumed to agree that reality looks such and such
a way).5 My point is not to argue that
Lawson is being inconsistent, either in moving from reality to science or
from the protocols of science to commonsensical empirical observations. But I
do want to point out that Lawson’s moves are not the only ones available to
us. For example, if we want to place reality at the center
of our work, then why must the protocols of science dictate the rules reality
must follow? Why should reality behave in a manner that fits a so-called
scientific method? If reality looks different—if it doesn’t seem to match the
particular model or concepts we are using, if there is something left over or
unaccounted for—then why not change the science? In the end, that’s precisely
the argument Lawson uses to rule out mainstream economics and to embrace
heterodox economics: the former can’t account for reality (at least as Lawson
understands it) while the latter can. Moreover, Lawson considers the
different schools of thought that make up heterodox economics to be merely
different perspectives on—different questions about, different ways of making
sense of—a common reality. But the only way this approach can work is if
social reality itself is taken to be both independent and singular:
independent of the way we think about it, and common to all forms of economic
and social analysis. Marxism
and Postmodernism There are many alternatives to
the way Lawson poses the problem of ontology. The two I have in mind, both of
which question the independence and singularity of reality, are associated
with Marxism and postmodernism (neither of which receives but brief mention
in Reorienting Economics). If Lawson’s approach hinges on
the idea that social reality is independent of the process of theorizing, the
Marxian tradition emphasizes the dialectical, interdependent nature of that
relationship. Without entering into unnecessary detail, what this means is,
on one hand, theory and social reality are seen to be mutually constitutive
and, on the other hand, the conception of reality produced by the process of
theorizing is considered to be distinct from reality itself. The mutual constitutivity of theory and reality is a way of focusing
attention on the role that each plays in determining the other: changes in
society lead to changes in theory, and vice versa. Thus, for example, social
reality contains the conditions of existence of economics (both the
discipline as well as individual schools of thought) and, in turn, the
process of economic theorizing affects—constitutes, reproduces, changes—the
society within which such theorizing takes place. This is not to say there is
a simple, one-to-one correspondence between the two (as is often presumed in
deterministic renditions of Marxism, according to which the emergence of
capitalism leads to the birth of economics, or different stages of capitalism
give rise to different economic theories). But it does place emphasis, in a
way that Lawson does not, on how changes in one lead to changes in the other,
in a never-ending pattern of interdependent influence and transformation.6 The contrast does not end
there. Marxists also make a distinction between the thought-concrete and the
concrete-real, between the conception of social reality produced in and by
the process of theorizing and the social reality within which that process
takes place.7 The two are not the same. From a Marxian
perspective, what social scientists (including economists) do is produce a
conception of social reality in thought, and these thoughts are not to be
conflated with the reality that exists outside of thought; they are literally
the appropriations within thought of
an external social reality. Thus, in a classical Marxian formulation, the
“movement from the abstract to the concrete” is a process that takes place
entirely within thought—the goal of which is to produce a more concrete
analysis of society (or of some part thereof) than what one began with. It is
more concrete in the sense that it includes more determinations; it takes
into account more factors that are constitutive (and, of course, constituted
by) the concepts under analysis. It makes no sense, then, to imagine or to
specify a relationship of approximation or correspondence between the product
of theorizing and the social reality that exists “out there,” outside theory. The postmodern
way of handling this problem is to refer to the discursive construction of social
reality.8 Again, proceding at a relatively general level, postmodernism
emphasizes both the way different social discourses produce different social
realities and the idea that social reality itself comprises social agents and
entities that use different discourses to construct the reality in which they
exist. Thus, there are two, different but related, senses in which the
economy can be said to be discursively constructed. First, different economic
theories—mainstream and heterodox, from neoclassical to Marxian—produce
different conceptions of economic and social reality. Economists literally
see and analyze different economies, according to the discourses (or
paradigms or theoretical frameworks) they use. And such “economic realities”
may be and often are radically different and incommensurable, produced and
elaborated according to different concepts and conceptual strategies. Thus,
to choose but one example, neoclassical economists perceive an economic
reality characterized by rational choices, factor payments, and equilibrium
whereas Marxian economists see commodity fetishism, exploitation, and
contradiction. And, from a postmodern perspective,
there is no transdiscursive or nondiscursive
standard whereby such different realities can be validated or adjudicated
(although, of course, such judgments often do take place within particular discourses, leading to quite different
conclusions). The second sense in which
postmodernists view the economy as being discursively constructed pertains to
economic events and practices themselves. The idea here is that economic and
social discourses—not just academic or scientific discourses but also
“everyday” discourses, about the economy and much else—affect the way
economic agents behave, institutions operate, and events occur. And, again,
different discourses will have different effects on such behaviors,
institutions, and events. The discourses I have in mind run the gamut from
ways of making sense of desire and labor (particulary with respect to economic agents) through
accounting conventions and notions of relevant stakeholders (in the case of
economic entities such as corporations and international trade organizations)
to the pronouncements of monetary authorities and corporate officials (which
affect the movements of interest rates and prices of equity shares). The
point is that the economy—specific parts or sectors as well as the economy as
a whole—will be affected by which discourses are present, and it is important
to analyze such discourses in order to understand economic reality. Put the two together—call it postmodern Marxism—and ontology acquires a status quite
different from the one outlined by Lawson. While a clear distinction is made
between social reality and the discourses about that reality, that’s just the
beginning of the story. It then becomes important to recognize the complex
ways social reality has an impact on social (including economic) discourses,
on how those discourses affect social reality, and on how social reality
itself is constituted by both academic and nonacademic
discourses. What this means is not only are discourses about the economy
influenced in important ways by the practices and discourses in the wider
society; it also means that economic discourses are “performative,”
in the sense that economic agents and institutions are constituted—brought
into being, reproduced and changed—in and through the ideas produced within
economics. Thus, for example, the “language of class” that characterizes
Marxian economics serves both to highlight class processes and to offer a
range of class identities and positions that can be inhabited by social
agents. Critical
Ontologies Not only do Marxism and
postmodernism, alone and together, call into question the independence of
theory and reality. They also offer ontologies that
are quite different from the one Lawson articulates and expounds as the
singular reality appropriate for economic science. The ontologies
associated with the Marxian and postmodern
methodologies discussed in the previous section are not based on the scheme
of verticality or depth that characterizes Lawson’s approach. For Lawson, all
social systems are composed of “surface actualities” (actual events and
states of affairs) and “underlying causes” (such as deeper structures,
powers, mechanisms, and so on)—and the point of economic and social analysis
is to show how the “deep” causes account for or explain the “surface” events.
But what if reality is taken to be a surface, which comprises a wide variety
of social agents, processes, and practices, wherein there is no relation of
depth or verticality? Does such a horizontal array of elements make economic
and social analysis impossible? The Marxian tradition has offered up one way
of making sense of such a social reality: overdetermination.9
Originally borrowed from Freud’s interpretation of dreams, the concept of overdetermination is a way of producing an ontology
wherein relations of depth (such as those between essence and appearance or
base and superstructure) are discarded in favor of
mutual relations of constitution and contradiction. Each problem or event
that is under analysis is then seen as being constituted by myriad other
aspects of social reality—to be the condensed effect of those other aspects
or dimensions—no one of which is accorded causal priority over, or more
ontological significance than, any other. It is the totality of such
effects—the conditions of existence, in this language—that accounts for the
contradictory constitution of any particular social actuality. Nothing
behind, nothing underneath; no levels of ontological priority or causation.
Just the constant movement and change that are occasioned by the overdetermined contradictions, the uneven pushes and
pulls, that define each object. What then of the rules of
conduct, power, mechanisms, and so on that Lawson attributes to a deeper or
transcendental level of reality? From a Marxian perspective, they are present
within the effects of the various processes and practices that make up social
reality. Even stronger: they are nothing but the presence of those effects.
Thus, for example, the rules of exploitation are contained within the
practices whereby surplus labor is appropriated
from the direct producers, practices that are themselves the overdetermined result of the other aspects of the social
totality—economic, political, and cultural—within which that exploitation
takes place. And it is that contradictory social reality that gives rise to
practices of exploitation as they exist as well as to the emergence of other,
nonexploitative class practices. It in this sense
that the flat, horizontal, surface ontology of Marxism provides the basis for
a critical analysis of reality, including a project of emancipation. Postmodernism also suggests
alternatives to the vertically oriented ontologies
of economic modernism.10 Indeed, much postmodern
critique has taken the form of a refusal or subversion of the idea that there
are essences to be discovered and that appearances are to be probed for the
truths hidden beneath the surface. Skeptical of all
forms of determinism—whether of necessary cause-and-effect relations or, less
strongly, probabilistic patterns that link particular events as causes with
other events as effects—postmodernists are inclined toward ontologies characterized by “depthlessness,” and emphasize the randomness of causation
and effectivity of chance, the indeterminacy of
events, the multiplicity of possible causes, the fluidity of the relationship
between seeming causes and their effects, and the reversibility of positions
between putative causes and effects. In the particular area of economics,
postmodernists are critical of both of the main forms of essentialism:
theoretical humanism (according to which social reality can be reduced to and
explained in terms of some underlying characeristics
of human beings) and structuralism (in which underlying structures can
account for and be used to explain social events). The alternative is a
surface comprising heterogenous elements—events,
actualities, behaviors, flows, connections, and so
on—that can be analyzed with alternative notions of causality—juxtaposition,
simultaneity, textuality, decentering,
and so forth. Based on its refusal of ontological hierarchy in favor of flatness, the goal of postmodern
analysis is thus to read the “text” of social reality, to produce a
“commentary” on the practices and subjectivities that define that reality. Again, the conjunction of
Marxism and postmodernism has produced alternatives both to mainstream
economics and to critical realism—in this case, new ontologies
and forms of social analysis. “Postmodern
materialism” is one such example.11 Originally inspired by Althusser’s notion of the “aleatory,”
postmodern materialism was formulated in order to
move beyond the systemic treatments associated with traditional Marxism, the
homogeneity and fixedness of social reality and the certainty of historical
trajectory—and to bring to the fore the more antisystemic
elements of the Marxian tradition—the heterogeneity and openness of social
reality, the incompleteness of the bourgeois project and the imagining of
alternative economic and social realities. On this interpretation, many
aspects of Marxian economic and social theory take on a new cast. The
specificity of Marx’s concept of value, to consider but one instance, instead
of being an expression of an underlying “law” of the division of labor (which presumes an aready
constituted homogeneity of social subjects, of homo faber), is now seen to be a way of
focusing on the cultural and political mechanisms whereby diverse communities
are stripped of their identities and needs in order to be molded
into the subjects of a single economic calculus. Thus, the “economy” would
emerge not as a primitive foundation, an independent and singular underlying
reality, but as the forced attempt to create a closed space whose principle
of existence is based on a negation of social specificity, heterogeneity, and
openness. Similarly, “poststructuralist
political economy” is an attempt to rescue the Marxian theory of class from
the primacy of the “capitalist totality”— the capitalist system or mode of
production, the global capitalist political economy, and so on—itself seen as
the expression of an underlying cause (such as the “law of accumulation”).12
A poststructuralist approach suggests a reading of Capital that emphasizes class as the discursive entry point of
political economy instead of being taken as a given of the social order. Once
reliquished from the limitations imposed by a
unified, centered ontology, an “accounting for
class” suggests both a diverse and differentiated economic
landscape—comprising both capitalist and noncapitalist
practices and identities—and a field of theory and politics that is open and
experimental. In other words, the ontology associated with poststructuralist
political economy is characterized not by closure and certainty but by
challenges and possibilities. It also clears the way for an active political
role for theory in creating the terms in which the identities of subjects are
constituted and through which they can create their futures. The result is to
defamiliarize existing notions of social reality,
to make that reality different from itself. Critical
Thought and Realism My aim in this brief essay is
not to elaborate or defend alternatives to critical realism in any detail. I
merely want to indicate that alternatives to the ontology proposed by Tony
Lawson, in Reorienting Economics
and elsewhere, have been developed within heterodox economics, including
Marxism and postmodernism. These alternative ontologies
have led to projects of economic and social analysis that are not only
critical of mainstream economics but quite productive in their own right. And I certainly don’t want to
argue that the alternative conceptions of ontology I have mentioned are any
more “real” than the one that can be found in Lawson’s work. While I share
with Lawson the idea that ontology is important, both for the critique of
mainstream economics and for the flourishing of heterodox economics, I admit
to being skeptical about the project of finding or
producing a single ontology that will serve as the shared foundation of the
various schools of thought that have come together in the post-autistic
economics movement. In my view, we need to do everything within out grasp to
keep critical approaches to economics alive by making reality as unreal as
possible. Acknowledgement I want to express my appreciation to
Edward Fullbrook not only for the invitation to
participate in this symposium (and his graciousness and patience in waiting
for my contribution) but also for all the work he has done to keep the
post-autistic economics movement alive. I also want to thank Antonio Callari for his comments on a previous draft. Endnotes 1. Disclosure:
a volume I co-edited with Stephen Cullenberg and Jack Amariglio, Postmodernism, Economics, and Knowledge
(2001), as well as another to which I contributed (Garnett 1999) were
published, with Lawson’s encouragement, in the Economics as Social Theory
series. 2. I take
this to be one of the main points raised by the students who initiated the
post-autistic movement, in France, England, and the United States. See the
statements and manifestos reprinted in Fullbrook (2003). 3. In the
United States right now, there is a particular poignancy to siding with
“reality-based” arguments against so-called “faith-based” ones. This is the
case as much in the discipline of economics as in the wider society. 4. See, e.g.,
my critique of the use of mathematical models in Marxian economics (Ruccio
1988; Ruccio and Amariglio 2003, especially chap. 1). 5. Antonio
Gramsci (1991) argued that common sense contains a “specific conception of
the world” and that “in acquiring one’s conception
of the world one always belongs to a particular grouping which is that of all
the social elements which share the same mode of thinking and acting” (324).
Clifford Geertz (1983), for his part, reminds us that such common sense, a
set of presumably shared observations about reality, “is not what the mind cleared of cant spontaneously apprehends” but
rather "what the mind filled with [historical and cultural
presuppositions]. . .concludes" (84). It is, in other words, a
historically and culturally specific knowledge—in this case, a local ontology.
6. To be
clear, the Marxian tradition admits of many different interpretations. The
one I develop here is often referred to as antiessentialist Marxism,
associated with the journal Rethinking
Marxism and the work of Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff (1987). 7. The
difference between the “concrete-in-thought” and the “concrete-real” was made
prominent by Louis Althusser (1970, 1977) as a way of distinguishing the
method of the “mature Marx” from that of Ludwig Feuerbach. 8. The
postmodern approach briefly summarized in the text is developed at some
length by Ruccio and Amariglio (2003). It is also more or less synonymous
with poststructuralism (Amariglio 1998) and deconstruction (Ruccio 1998). See
also the different interpretations of postmodernism with respect to economics
in Cullenberg et al. (2001). 9. See, e.g.,
the pioneering contribution of Resnick and Wolff (1987). 10. Within
social theory, postmodern ontologies have been developed perhaps most
prominently within feminism, especially with respect to the gendered body.
See, e.g., the work of Judith Butler (1990, 1993), Jane Flax (1990, 1993),
and Elizabeth Grosz (1994). Gillian Hewitson (1999) and Suzanne Bergeron
(2004), among others, have developed similar arguments with respect to
economic discourse. 11. The
concept of postmodern materialism and its effects on social analysis are
elaborated by Ruccio and Callari (1996). 12. This view
is developed at length in the essay by Gibson-Graham et al. (2001). On the
theoretical and political problems created by an ontology defined solely in
terms of capitalism—what one might refer to as capitalocentrism—see
Gibson-Graham (1996) and Ruccio and Gibson-Graham (2001). References Althusser, L. 1970. Reading Capital. Trans. B. Brewster. London: New Left Books. ———. 1977. For Marx. Trans. B. Brewster. London: New Left Books. Amariglio, J. 1998. “Poststructuralism.”
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Modernity. Ann Arbor University of Michigan
Press. Butler, J. 1990. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New
York: Routledge. Butler, J. 1993. Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limit of Sex. New York: Routledge. Cullenberg, S; J. Amariglio;
and D. F. Ruccio, eds. 2001. Postmodernism, Economics, and Knowledge. New York: Routledge. Flax, J. 1990. Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and Postmodernism in
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G. N. Smith. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Grosz, E. 1994. Volatile Bodies, Toward a Corporeal Feminism. Bloomington:
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