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Forum on Economic
Reform In recent decades the alliance of neoclassical economics and neoliberalism has hijacked the term “economic
reform”. By presenting political
choices as market necessities, they have subverted public debate about what
economic policy changes are possible and are or are not desirable. This venue promotes discussion of economic
reform that is not limited to the one ideological point of view. The Rise and Demise of the New Public Management Wolfgang Drechsler (University of Tartu and Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia) ©
Copyright: Wolfgang Drechsler 2005 Within the public sphere, the most
important reform movement of the last quarter of a century has been the New
Public Management (NPM). It is of particular interest in the
post-autistic economics (pae) context because NPM largely rests on the same ideology and epistemology
as standard textbook economics (STE) is based (for my take on this, see Drechsler 2000), and it has had, and still has, similar
results. Already more on the defensive
within public administration (PA) than STE is within economics, NPM also shows that such major paradigm shifts in theory
and policy may actually happen. In
addition, it occasionally appears that pae-oriented
scholars have overlooked the fact that some features in public management
reform, state organization, and the economic interpretation of state
functions that they advocate – from “Good Governance” to “efficiency” as a
goal in itself – actually belong into the “other camp” and by and large have
a disastrous effect on “industrial” and “developing” countries alike, although
the consequences for the latter are much more severe. NPM is the transfer of business and market
principles and management techniques from the private into the public sector,
symbiotic with and based on a neo-liberal understanding of state and
economy. The goal, therefore, is a
slim, reduced, minimal state in which any public activity is decreased and,
if at all, exercised according to business principles of efficiency. NPM is based on
the understanding that all human behavior is always
motivated by self-interest and, specifically, profit maximization. Epistemologically, it shares with STE the
quantification myth, i.e. that everything relevant can be quantified;
qualitative judgments are not necessary.
It is popularly denoted by concepts such as project management, flat
hierarchies, customer orientation, abolition of career civil service, depolitization, total quality management, and
contracting-out. NPM comes from Anglo-America, and it was strongly pushed by most of the
International Finance Institutions (IFI’s) such as
the World Bank and the IMF. It originates from the 1980s with their
dominance of neo-liberal governments (especially Thatcher and Reagan) and the
perceived crisis of the Welfare state, but it came to full fruition in the
early 1990s. NPM
is part of the neo-classical economic imperialism within the social sciences,
i.e. the tendency to approach all questions with neo-classical economic
methods. In advanced PA scholarship itself,
especially – but not only – in Europe, NPM is on
the defensive by now, if taken as a world view (i.e. an ideology), rather
than as one of several useful perspectives for PA reform (i.e. part of a
pluralistic approach). The question
here is more whether one favors post-NPM (anti-NPM) or post-post-NPM, Weberian-based PA,
the latter being the most advanced, and the most sophisticated, and now
called the Neo-Weberian State (NWS). What was an option ten years ago is not an
option anymore today. I would say that
in PA •
in 1995, it was still possible to believe in NPM,
although there were the first strong and substantial critiques •
in 2000, NPM was on the defensive, as empirical findings
spoke clearly against it as well •
in 2005, NPM is not a viable concept anymore Yet, in many areas, both of scholarship
and of the world, as well as in policy, NPM is very
alive and very much kicking. It is,
therefore, necessary to look both at the concept itself and at the reasons
for its success. Basic
Problems of the New Public Management As important and, though more rarely, as successful as
several NPM-inspired reforms of the public sector
might have been and still may be, what one notices first when looking at the
public and private spheres is the difference, not the similarity. The state is denoted primarily by its
monopoly of power, force, and coercion on one side and its orientation
towards the public good, the commonweal or the ben commune, on the other; the business world legitimately focuses
on profit maximization. NPM, however, as it has been said, “harvests” the public;
it sees no difference between public and private interest. The use of business techniques within the
public sphere thus confuses the most basic requirements of any state,
particularly of a Democracy, with a liability: regularity, transparency, and
due process are simply much more important than low costs and speed. This low-cost and speed imperative is
directly related to the main battle-cry of NPM,
efficiency, which is invariably defined much too narrowly in NPM – perhaps, this misunderstanding is even defining,
and systemic to, NPM. Efficiency is a relative concept that is
based on context and appropriateness: it is efficient to achieve a certain
effect with a minimum of resources.
But this effect, in the case of the state, is denoted by several auxiliary
but necessary conditions such as the ones mentioned above; it is never
profit maximization. (It could be
argued that most activities carried out by the public sector are there
precisely because no direct profit or gain can be made.) If you go for savings and neglect context
and even the actual goals, you will not be efficient but rather the ultimate
wastrel. (Not for nothing are wastrels
and misers considered to be the same type of sinner in Dante’s Hell.) This misunderstanding of the concept of
efficiency and the depolitization that comes with
it are typical symptoms of technocracy and bureaucracy, which NPM professes to oppose but which, as Eugenie Samier has demonstrated, it rather fosters. (2001) As a result of this insight, we are currently
witnessing a fundamental shift of emphasis in PA discourse, and even
practice, from efficiency to effectiveness, i.e. in effect from getting
something done cheaply to actually accomplishing one’s goal. But even by the standards of business
efficiency, NPM cannot be said to be successful
from today’s perspective. We have no
empirical evidence that NPM reforms have led to any
productivity increase or welfare maximization. At best, one may say that “Several years of
attempts and experiences of public management reforms in western Europe and
other OECD countries give evidence of relative failure rather than success.”
(van Mierlo 1998: 401; see Manning 2000, section
“Did it work?” on global evidence along these lines – this is the web-page of
the World Bank!) The catchword
promises have empirically not been delivered – flat hierarchies are a matter
of appropriateness and depend in their suitability entirely on context;
taking the citizen merely as customer takes away her participatory rights and
duties and thus hollows out the state; the abolition of career civil service
will usually let administrative capacity erode; depolitization
– and thus de-democratization – leads to the return of the imperial
bureaucrat (in its worst sense, disguised as the entrepreneurial bureaucrat –
same power, less responsibility); and contracting-out has proven to be
excessively expensive and often infringing on core competences of the state
as well as on the most basic standards of equity. Total Quality Management is actually not
necessarily an NPM concept; it can be just as well
used elsewhere and was actually always understood to be part of a
well-working PA; project management may frequently work, but as a principle
and in the long run, it is more expensive and less responsible than the
traditional approach.
But even if we take a more narrow
definition of state, if the 1990s have shown anything, it is the remarkable
resilience of the state. Indeed, since
1989, we have more states than ever; the breakup of
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as of Czechoslovakia, are striking
European examples. What one thus has
seen, at least in part, is the re-emergence not only of statehood, but even
of the nation state. Moreover, the EU,
paradigm for times to come in all of Europe, is a state structure,
constitutional crisis or not. There is
a complex discussion about the legal “stateness” of
the EU, but it certainly is a state if one uses a
functional definition, which is what matters for PA and which is what is done
here. What is more, the EU is a Continental “state”, organized and working along
Continental, viz. French and/or
German, lines. Further, the state is not only as capable
to act and as necessary as it ever was – the tools that challenge it, such as
the new ways of communication and organization, have at the same time
immensely increased its powers. Most
importantly, key economic and development issues of today, sustainability,
dynamic development, innovation, and technology, actually foster the role of
the state in economic growth. (See Reinert
1999) The Schumpeterian,
innovation-based world cannot be imagined without a capable state actor. If we follow Carlota Perez’ theory of
Techno-Economic Paradigm Shifts (2002), then we are now entering the synergy
phase of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
surge – or Kondratieff –, which requires a particularly active state with
strong administrative capacity. And after all, these insights form much of
the basis of the
EU’s main development program, the Lisbon Stragegy, which puts innovation as
the basis of national and EU development, thus absolutely requiring a capable
state. Even in light of the current
crisis of the EU, as well as of the problems of the Lisbon Strategy’s
implementation and ongoing dilution, the centrality of this agenda remains
undiminished. One may even say that
since it was primarily the fears of the effects of Globalization (and the
functional elite’s disregard of those fears) which caused the crisis, the one
strategy that addresses the causes and potential sources of those problems is
more important than ever. And there is
not much of an alternative anywhere – as Ha-Joon
Chang says, the “plain fact is that the Neo-Liberal ‘policy reforms’ have not
been able to deliver their central promise – namely, economic growth,” and
that the “developing” countries grew better under the “bad” policies of
1960-1980. (2002: 128) Fashion and Rhetoric
Public sector
reform is in fashion and no self-respecting government can afford to ignore
it. How a fashion is established is
one of the most intriguing questions of public policy. Part of the answer lies in policy diffusion
brought about by the activities of international officials (whose zeal for
administrative reform mysteriously stops short at the door of their own
organizations), by meetings of public administrators, academics, and the
so-called policy entrepreneurs. (Wright 1997: 8) Indeed, the international
vocabulary of management reforms carries a definite normative ‘charge’. Within the relevant community of discourse
… the assumption has grown that particular things – performance management, TQM … and so on – are
progress. To be progressive one has to
be seen to be doing things to which these particular labels can be stuck. … Suggesting, for example, that an existing
or new activity would be better placed within an enlarged central ministry or
as a direct, state-provided service, becomes an uphill struggle – it is
‘beyond the pale’, not the done thing. (Pollitt and
Bouckaert 2004: 201) In PA, the problem is that on the one
hand, experts are hired both on the basis of fashionability
and of their capacity to suggest change, not to say that things should remain
as they are – the main reason why international consultancy has gone strongly
for NPM. On
the other hand, for politicians it is very practical to turn to experts,
because it alleviates them from the pressure to, first, find out what the
proper decision should be and, second, to implement possibly unpopular
measures. Under the cloak of
efficiency, NPM specifically returns
decision-making to the allegedly expert bureaucrat, therefore removing
political control, and that also means political responsibility, from the
political sphere. “It may be
convenient for politicians to hide behind the smoke-screen of managerial
decision and autonomy, but this hardly adds to the democratic quality of
decision-making.” (Wright 1997: 11) For many a politician, the safest and most
attractive-looking move is to follow fashion – and the weaker, the more
insecure he is, the more this is the case.
(“A statesman is a politician who uses expert advice but does not
depend on it.”) These are “the symbolic and legitimacy benefits of
management reform. For politicians,
these benefits consist partly of being seen to be doing something. … They may
gain in reputation – indeed may make a career out of – ‘modernizing’ and
‘streamlining’ activities.” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 6)
Rhetoric is what satisfies the demand; it does not mean that one has
to do anything. The problem is only
that at some point, in the not too long run, the demise of the state will
progress too far, the public will realize that there are delivery problems,
and not only public trust will erode even more. The Weberian Model The counter-model to NPM,
indeed its bête noire, is what is
called “Weberian PA”. This label is highly problematic, as NPM presents a caricature of it and thus builds up a
paper tiger. Its namesake himself, the
great German sociologist and economist Max Weber, did not even particularly
like the model of PA so described; he only saw it, rightly, as the most
rational and efficient one for his time, and the one towards which PA would
tend. That this is by and large still
the case 80 years later if one looks at the model rather than at its
caricature is something that would have probably surprised him quite a
bit. (He also described, almost
clairvoyantly, the NPM system, which for him was
the most dehumanizing of organizational forms; see Samier
2001.) Apart from the caricature, for Weber, the
most efficient PA was a set of offices in which appointed civil servants
operated under the principles of merit selection (impersonality), hierarchy,
the division of labor, exclusive employment, career
advancement, the written form, and legality.
This increase of rationality – his key term – would increase speed,
scope, predictability, and cost-effectiveness, as needed for an advanced
mass-industrial society. (Weber 1922: esp. 124-130) And although we are well beyond such a
world – and in what we may or may not call the “network society” –, these, or
almost all of these, are not obsolete criteria, but in fact, they are
exceedingly close to most of the recent large-scale principles of PA reform
agendas worldwide, including the European Administrative Space’s main
standards of reliability and predictability, openness and transparency,
accountability, and efficiency and effectiveness (SIGMA 1998: 8-14). Most certainly, they are closer to
responsible PA reform than the catchwords of NPM. Regarding the specter of
the ancien régime of traditional
bureaucracy, part of almost every era’s and country’s folklore as it seems,
it is important to realize that in general, “publicness / public sphere –
politics – administration … will remain, in spite of all modernization, a culturally-founded tension. Thus, the critique of bureaucracy will
remain permanent as well.” (Laux 1993: 345) Yet, the alternative to bad PA – what
“bureaucracy” is in common parlance – is not the abolition of PA, but good
PA, one that works for state, society, and economy alike. “The direct correlation between the
capabilities of government and countries’ development … is based on vast
historical evidence. The most powerful
nations’ strength and ability to create and distribute wealth cannot be
explained without acknowledging the central role of public
institutions.” (Echebarría
2001: 1) And this is not limited to
the “First World”. Ever since the
study by Evans and Rauch of 35 “developing” countries (1999), we also know
empirically that Weberianism, especially the Merit
principle, “significantly enhance[s] prospects of economic growth.” (748)
And these findings have been backed up most recently by the fact that Weberianism has worked very well indeed in the
transition states of Central and Eastern Europe, in that the ranking of their
economic and social success, especially if one looks at Hungary, is not by
accident very similar to that of their Weberianness. As the very last argument, doesn’t
information and communication technology (ICT)
change this? In a world of
e-governance, isn’t Weberianism, new or old,
hopelessly obsolete? As all research
on the subject matter has shown – although this is perhaps the most
fashionable field of research, and thus the one with the worst overall
results –, it is not. The written form
does not become less real if it takes the form of an e-mail or a website
rather than of a letter or physical ledger; in a way, perhaps more so,
because it is more accessible.
Hierarchy and subsidiarity, control and
information flow, but also standardization and the division of labor were never as easy as with ICT. The hierarchy issue is the one that may be
debated, but it, too, has several sides, including that it may be
communication and not layers that truly matters in a network society, and
that the principle of subsidiarity actually
requires a hierarchical organizational set-up. (See Drechsler
2005b) The Neo-Weberian State
‘Weberian’
Elements •
Reaffirmation of the role of the
state as the main facilitator of solutions to the new problems of
globalization, technological change, shifting demographics, and environmental
threat •
Reaffirmation of the role of representative democracy
(central, regional, and local) as the legitimating element within the state
apparatus •
Reaffirmation of administrative law – suitably modernized –
in preserving the basic principles pertaining to the citizen-state
relationship, including equality before the law, legal security, and the
availability of specialized legal scrutiny of state actions •
Preservation of the idea of a public service with a
distinct status, culture, and terms and conditions ‘Neo’ Elements •
Shift from an internal
orientation towards bureaucratic rules towards an external orientation
towards meeting citizens’ needs and wishes.
The primary route to achieving this is not the employment of market
mechanisms (although they may occasionally come in handy) but the creation of
a professional culture of quality and service •
Supplementation (not replacement)
of the role of representative democracy by a range of devices for
consultation with, and direct representation of, citizens’ views (…) •
In the management of resources
within government, a modernization of the relevant laws to encourage a
greater orientation on the achievements of results rather than merely the
correct following of procedure. This
is expressed partly in a shift from ex
ante to ex post controls, but
not a complete abandonment of the former •
A professionalization of the
public service, so that the ‘bureaucrat’ becomes not simply an expert in the
law relevant to his or her sphere of activity, but also a professional
manager, oriented to meeting the needs of his or her citizen/users (99-100) What I would propose, quite in Weber’s
sense, is that this is not only a classification or analytical model, it is
also once again a normative one: An administrative system generally works
better, of course depending on time and place, the closer it is to the NWS. We have seen
why, I think. Good Governance: The Back Door
This being realized, it
is now important to beware of the “thief that cometh in the night.” NPM may be in
demise – but what about the currently ever-so-popular concept of Good
Governance? Arising, once again, in
the 1980s in the International Finance Institutions (IFI’s), this was a positive extrapolation
from the negative experiences that these organizations had had in the
“developing” countries by observing that financial aid seemed to have had no
effects. From this, they deduced an
absence of institutions, principles, and structures, the entirety of which
was called “Governance” – and “Good Governance” when they worked well. A good idea as such – but the provenience,
the same as with NPM, may make us halt, and
rightly. (See Doornbos 2004)
By and large, the term
“Governance” has by now become a more or less neutral concept that focuses on
steering mechanisms in a certain political unit, emphasizing the interaction
of state (First), business (Second), and society (Third Sector) players. “Good Governance”, on the other hand, is
not at all neutral; rather, it is a normative concept that again embodies a
strong value judgment in favor of the retrenchment of the state, which is
supposed to yield to Business standards, principles, and – not least –
interests. In that sense, “Good
Governance” privileges the Second over the First Sector, even in First Sector
areas.
The Hatter … had taken his
watch out of his pocket, and was looking at it uneasily…. “Two days wrong! … I told you butter
wouldn’t suit the works!” he added, looking angrily at the March Hare. “It was the best butter,” the March Hare meekly
replied. (Carroll 1865) As this implies, ‘Good’, like its superlative,
is often a relative term, meaning ‘good of its kind’, or for its standard
purpose, whatever that may be. Failing
such a reference, the judgment of goodness is indeterminate, and cannot be
applied or debated without risk of confusion.
[Thus, the March Hare’s statement is right in that the butter was
best] as butter goes, no doubt, but not as a mechanical lubricant.
(Heath1974: 68 N5) The same is true, of course, regarding the
“Good” in “Good Governance”: It is not good in any general or generalizable sense, but as pertains to what most of the IFI’s in the 1980s thought was good – a perspective that
today is probably not shared by many experts anymore, including those within
the IFI’s themselves. And indeed, what the respective IFI’s held to be good in the 1980s was neo-liberalism,
the Free Market as a world view, and thus the retrenchment of the state. Within the state sector itself, many of
the principles of “Good Governance” are therefore identical with NPM. And while a
unitary definition of the concept never existed, not even within the
respective individual IFI’s, “good” principles
usually encompassed such concepts as transparency, efficiency, participation,
responsibility, and market economy, state of law, democracy, and
justice. Many of them are indubitably
“good” as such, but all of them – except the last one, which is the most
abstract – are heavily context-dependent, hinging not only on definition and
interpretation, but also on time and place.
Critics from the “developing” countries thus often saw and see the
demand for “Good Governance” as a form of Neo-Colonialist Imperialism and as
part of negative Globalization, since it demands the creation of institutions
and structures before economic
development, while all wealthy countries of the “West” established them only
afterwards. Inspired by, but in the end independently
from, the development discourse, the terms “Governance” and – to a lesser,
but still significant degree – “Good Governance” soon traveled
into the parlance of general social science and policy discussions. The problem is that the underlying ideology
has not fully been realized, and that “Good Governance” is often still
thought to be good governance, even by otherwise quite sophisticated Third
Sector representatives, especially from activist NGO’s, who view the concept
as one that integrates them into First Sector processes. But no good
governance, and no NGO participation either, is possible without a
well-working government to begin with – and that means, among other things,
no weakening of state capacity, and no NPM. Intellectual Post-Mortem Actually, for a
post-mortem of New Public Management (NPM), it may seem a bit early, seeing
in how many places one still can get away with it. But in a very classical sense, the head of
the movement – to avoid a more rhetorical metaphor from the animal kingdom –
seems to have been cut off, or at least to have disappeared. In other words, it has become quite rare
during the last five years, and is becoming rarer still, to see articles in
the very top journals, or essays and keynote addresses by the very top PA
scholars – especially in Europe, but also in the United States –, based on,
or implicitly assuming the validity, of NPM.
In that sense, it is
legitimate to speak of the demise of NPM, and to already investigate what
stopped it – all the more interesting because of the lessons this may present
for standard textbook
economics (STE). Because after all, NPM was a formidable,
genuine paradigm, backed by the self-logic of the profession, the mightiest
donors, and most importantly, the zeitgeist,
the sense of “coolness” it had, and the catering to prejudices – based as
often on genuine grievances as on mere modern folklore – against bureaucracy
and the state as such. Here one can only
speculate for the moment and look at the arguments against NPM presented
before. One of the key reasons why it
could not last is that PA is a very heterogeneous field of scholarship,
combining scholars from a variety of backgrounds and a variety of
contemporary disciplines, such as law, political science, and public
administration proper. It was always
possible to receive a chair, for instance, even if one was fundamentally
anti-NPM. In addition, the field of PA
as a scholarly discipline is quite small, and the pyramid of scientific
prestige is very narrow at the top, so a few very senior scholars and a few
key publications really can make a difference. A third reason is that
there were many PA scholars and practicioners from pre-NPM times who had
never liked the concept, be it for good or – such in the case of Continental
lawyers and old-fashioned bureaucrats – for bad reasons. They were only too willing to see it go,
and they jumped at possibilities, like the Neo-Weberian State (NWS), to be
modern yet not to give up their organizational principles. (This is why it is so important to see the
post-post-NPM quality of the NWS, which is neither pre-NPM nor post-NPM in
the sense of anti-NPM, and to take the “neo”-elements seriously.) Before this background,
the plain and empiricially observable fact that NPM simply does not work,
even by its own strict set of criteria – that it does not deliver, that it
does not create greater business efficiency, let alone state effectiveness,
that it is expensive, disruptive, and in the end useless, that it is heavily
ideological, overly simple, diametrically opposed to economic growth and
especially development, and politically charged by a specific perspective,
that of neo-liberalism – could have the effect that it toppled as a paradigm. In comparison to
economics, what that means is that what is usually a negative feature of PA,
its interdisciplinarity and thus lack of clear method, and its small scope,
were actually very beneficial in this case, because NPM never created, on the
scholarly level, the kind of institutional rigidity that STE was able to
achieve. It was always much more easy
to make a career in PA as an anti-NPM scholar than it is as an anti-STE
scholar in economics. But still, there
were and even are a lot of vested interests in NPM, and thus, it may be
encouraging from a Post-Autistic Economics perspective to see that a
prevailing paradigm may fall – mainly, in the end, “just” because it does not
work. Conclusion
the years following the
Washington Consensus were dominated by reforms based on the idea that less
government is better, when the correct idea would have been that better
government is better. Privatization,
deregulation, decentralization, and simple cessation and abandonment of
entire sectors of activity because of insufficient resources, marked the
reform agenda. … in more than a few cases, the result was a rickety,
disjointed government, defenseless in the face of
problems for which it nevertheless remains responsible to society, and whose
credibility has been undermined by the ideological devaluation that
accompanied reform. (Echebarría 2001: 2, on Latin
America) The key to succesful PA
reform, vital as it is not only, but also, for economic growth, as well as,
if you will, for good governance, is to strengthen administrative capacity
and competence of a responsive and responsible state. The
optimal solution for this is a genuine post-post-NPM system, Weberian-based
but with the lessons from NPM learned, which – and this is not less right for
being a cliché – puts the human person into the center of administrative
decision-making. And this is a
Neo-Weberian State, with attention to the specific local reality, and
with the final goal, as always, of the Good Life in the Good State. (See
Drechsler 2003) PA, especially in
Europe, is on the best way thither. It
remains to be seen when, and how, economics can follow. Note References Chang, Ha-Joon (2002). Kicking Away the Ladder. Development Strategy in Historical
Perspective. London: Anthem. Doornbos, Martin (2004). “‘Good
Governance’: The Pliability of a Policy Concept.” Trames 8(4): 372-387. Drechsler, Wolfgang (2005a). “The
Re-Emergence of ‘Weberian’ Public Administration
after the Fall of New Public Management: The Central and Eastern European
Perspective.” Halduskultuur 6: 94-108. On the net at http://deepthought.ttu.ee/hum/halduskultuur/Wolfgang%20Drechsler%2094-108.pdf. Drechsler, Wolfgang (2005b). “eGovernment and Public Management Reform.” Presentation
at the eGovernance Catalonia Forum ’05: Public
Administration in the Age of the Internet, Barcelona, 13 June 2005. Slides,
as well as video of the presentation dubbed in Catalan and Spanish, on the
net at http://www.gencat.net/forum-egovernance/2005/cat/ponencies.htm.
Drechsler, Wolfgang (2004).
“Governance, Good Governance, and Government: The Case for Estonian Administrative
Capacity.” Trames
8(4): 388-396. Drechsler, Wolfgang (2003). Lessons
for Latin America and the Caribbean in Managing Public Sector Restructuring:
Public Sector Downsizing and Redeployment Programs in Central and Eastern
Europe. Washington, DC: International Development Bank, Regional Policy
Dialogue, Public Management and Transparency Network. On the net at http://www.iadb.org/int/DRP/ing/Red5/Documents/Drechsler12-03eng.pdf;
Spanish version at http://www.iadb.org/int/DRP/esp/Red5/Documentos/Drechsler12-03esp.pdf. Drechsler, Wolfgang (2001). Good and Bad Government: Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s Frescoes
in the Siena Town Hall as Mission Statement for Public Administration Today.
Budapest: Open Society Institute & Local Government Initiative. On the
net at http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/default.asp?id=61
(without the key color plates – these can be
viewed, e.g., at http://gallery.euroweb.hu/html/l/lorenzet/ambrogio/governme/index.html
or at http://www.abcgallery.com/L/lorenzetti/alorenzetti.html). Drechsler, Wolfgang (2000). “On the
Possibility of Quantitative-Mathematical Social Science, Chiefly Economics:
Some Preliminary Considerations.” Journal
of Economic Studies 27(4/5): 246-259. On the net at http://www.ingentaconnect.com/search/expand?pub=infobike://mcb/002/2000/00000027/00000004/art00001. Echebarría, Koldo
(2001). Government Modernization and Civil Service Reform: Democratic
Strengthening, Consolidation of the Rule of Law, and Public Policy
Effectiveness. Washington, DC: International Development Bank, Regional
Policy Dialogue, Public Management and Transparency Network. Evans, Peter and James E. Rauch (1999). “Bureaucracy and Growth: A
Cross-National Analysis of the Effectiveness of ‘Weberian’
State Structures on Economic Growth.” American
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