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Neutrality Is Overrated
Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra (National University of Mexico)
© Copyright 2004 Juan
Pablo Pard-Guerra
In past issues of this journal I have encountered some interesting
statements on the things that must change in order to build a post-autistic
economic theory. Being a citizen of the South, I subscribe to most of them
and greatly welcome the discussions. However, of the sea of comments and
proposals, the ones that caught the greatest part of my attention were those
which used specific terms that conceal, in one way or another, the idea of
“good” and “bad” science, and in general hinting at the notion that existing
economics falls into the second category and should be moved onto the first.
So let me start this paper by saying that science, in any of its forms and in
any time and place, cannot be measured with the uncomfortable parameters of
“goodness” or “badness”. Doing so is a wild goose chase and one of the
impasses that a post-autistic economic theory should try to avoid. Therefore,
as I will explain, talking of a more scientific economic theory is a dead-end
road.
In particular, there have been two PAER articles in
which economics is either directly or indirectly related to science by means
of the construction of either a new discourse or of a new methodology. The
first and most comprehensive of these is the paper by James Galbraith, in
which he mentions the necessity of building a “theory of human behavior based on the principles of social interaction”
which privileges empirical work while being free from “interest-group
politics”1. On the other side of the spectrum, Claude Mouchot presents ideas on how to develop a “scientific
discourse in economics” from a purely philosophical, realist perspective2.
The problem with these two and many other discussions on the topic lies in
the attempt to make economics a more
scientific discipline, as if its level of scientificity were to assure
success of any kind. Pursuing a scientific discourse for economics is
perpetuating the age-old idea that science is better, that science is good,
and that science leads us to the truth and to an improved description of our
universe and our future.
But science is, just as economics, a particular discourse, a tradition
connected to the ideals of rationality and of progress which are rooted in a
culture-specific, western perspective3. We say that science works
and that science is good because, to a considerable degree, we have defined
“efficiency” and “goodness” on the basis of what science can achieve. Science
is not a miracle-worker nor is it a tool with unlimited reach. Science has
boundaries, science is human, science is flawed and science is biased. Any
economic theory consistent with the prevailing scientific discourse is bound
to inherit all the flaws and quirks of the discourse it was built upon.
Furthermore, the idea that a scientific
economic theory–whatever this may come to mean—is neutral, cannot be
further from the truth. The neutrality of science is a construct and, in
general terms, grossly overrated. And
in a world where billions of people live under the line of extreme poverty,
were macro policies have left myriad micro-disasters, and where conflicts for
resources as vital as water are imminent in the short-run, neutrality is our
worst reference. What we need is not to pursue the ghost of neutrality and scientificity,
but rather to build economic theories for the new political agenda,
confronting the issues of cultural diversity, resource sustainability and
overall human security.
A central component in many of the discussions on the steps we need to follow
in order to achieve a more scientific corpus
for economic theories is the idea of assembling a dogma-free, politically
sterile discipline. Many of the complaints about the current way economics is
being handled are that it hides vested interests, conceals political agendas
and sequesters propaganda, thus being a sort of ill-constructed doctrine
freely imposed throughout the world. Some believe that by ridding the
discipline of its unscientific nature,
all this will fade away.
To some extent the first ideas about the biased nature of economics are
correct. For the specific case of the neo-classical theory we can find a
great number of suppositions and hypotheses that are unlikely to be the
object of generalization. A peasant in rural Oaxaca is doubtfully the
embodiment of the utility maximizing rational agent portrayed throughout
mainstream economic textbooks. Neoclassical economic theory provides the
prototype that is (was) needed for economic survival and expansion in the
West, but that does not necessarily have to work elsewhere. However, the
problem here is not with the theory itself, but rather with the way it is
being implemented. Theory is simply not the same as application. They work at
different levels and thus have to be clearly delimited. But by trying to link
economics to a scientific discourse, this application is immediately shielded
from criticisms and hard to break down, since it no longer is the
prescription of a fragile
discipline but rather the product of hard
science.
In this sense, it is imperative to recognize that economics has a manifest
dual nature: on one hand it can serve as a reinforcement for a set of
normative structures by generating instructions about what things ought to be; on the other hand, it can
be a descriptive set of statements on how the world will react given a very
specific collection of conditions and hypotheses. If we are careful enough to
segregate these two faces of the discipline in both classrooms and textbooks
and remember constantly that application is not the same as theory, many
problems can be prevented, specifically the unmeasured use of economic theory
as a form of the scientific discourse. Economics is not physics (even physics
may not be physics), so we should cut this risky idea at the root.
Closing the gap between the hard sciences and economics could be
counterproductive in domains other than the applied. Instead of expanding our
knowledge, pursuing this may leave us with less than what we started with.
Science, specifically physics, is the art of simplification, a body of
approximated facts about our
surroundings (as one of my teachers once said, “physicists live in a world of
point masses, coherent states and spherical cows.”) The economic world is far
more complex than what physics, biology or chemistry can depict. In fact,
even the physical world is far more complex than what physics can depict. And
though the last couple of decades have seen the birth of a new type of
physics–namely, complex systems analysis -- dedicated precisely to studying
processes which normal, old-school physics has trouble approaching -- this
area is still in diapers and is a long way from obtaining important, tangible
achievements. Until there is a scientific theory of complex systems, binding
economics and science is one of the worst things we can do.
So what can we do with science in connection to economics? Is searching for a
connection useful at all? My answer to
the last question is a robust yes. Other sciences may not provide us with the
blueprint for a post-autistic economic theory, but they do give us an
impressive toolbox for the analysis of real economic systems. Computer
simulations, the dynamics of phase transitions, non-equilibrium
thermodynamics, genetic algorithms and evolutionary theory are just some of
the specific areas that might prove to be useful for the study of economic
processes since they are, in many ways, the first theories of complex,
real-world behaviors. However, this does not mean
that we should be constrained only to what physics and other disciplines may
offer. If we are to succeed in the creation of a stronger and less autistic economic theory, we need
to develop our own toolbox—perhaps inspired by the one provided by other
disciplines—applicable to the behaviors of
individuals, groups and societies with different historical and cultural
backgrounds and without relying on specific behavioral
hypotheses. But tools are only tools, and we should not loose from sight that
they do not constitute the main body of a theory. Economics should be more
than mere analysis. If we are to build a theory that escapes the current
autistic cycle, we must become more sensitive to the possibility of change,
something that cannot come from analysis alone. We need to innovate, not to
copy what others have done or at least attempted at doing. The world we live
in, with its mountain of problems and needs, requires fresh solutions, not
old ones dressed in postmodern clothes.
Notes
1. James
K. Galbraith, “Can we please move on? A note on the Guerrien
debate”, post-autistic economics review,
issue no. 15, September 4, 2002, article 2.
2. Claude Mouchot, “Towards a realist epistemology for economics”, post-autistic economics review, issue
no. 15, September 4, 2002, article 4.
3. Jurgen Habermas, Ciencia y tecnica
como “ideologia” Tecnos: Madrid
(1997).
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SUGGESTED
CITATION:
Juan
Pablo Pardo-Guerra, “Neutrality Is Overrated”, post-autistic
economics review, issue no. 24, 15 March 2004, article 2, http://www.pacon.net/PAEReview/issue
24/PardoGuerra24.htm
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