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Amartya Sen Again Emmanuelle Benicourt (École
des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales,
France) © Copyright 2004
Emmanuelle Benicourt In issue 15 of
this journal1, I argued that Sen was a
neoclassical economist, and questioned why heterodox economists considered
his “capability approach” as a real force in post-autistic economics. Two
responses have appeared. First, Ingrid
Robeyns2 argued that the view according to which the capability
approach is undeniably neoclassical, just a variation of standard economics,
is “fundamentally mistaken” (i.e., Sen is not
neoclassical). Second, Jorge Buzaglo3 admitted Sen
was neoclassical, but argued that he was a radical-progressive economist
(i.e., Sen applies the conventional apparatus to
the advancement of a progressive cause). Curiously, these responses are
contradictory. I will examine each in
turn.
Sen’s
normative framework Ingrid Robeyns pursues her Defence of Amartya Sen by saying : “the capability approach gives a consistent
normative framework to place these scattered studies [of development,
development ethics, unemployment, famines, gender inequality, etc] , thus
providing a sort of theoretical umbrella for existing empirical work.
Moreover, the capability approach makes it very clear how different
dimensions, such as commodities, observable outcomes and unobservable
opportunities are related.” This is incorrect.
Indeed it runs contrary to Sen’s central idea.
Remember that Sen’s normative approach is
deliberately pluralist. This comes from his critique of and departure from
utilitarianism. Sen refuses to apprehend well-being
in a unilateral way (with the criterion of general happiness or public utility).
As he says in Development as Freedom: To insist that there should be only one homogeneous magnitude that we
value is to reduce drastically the range of our evaluative reasoning. It is
not, for example, to the credit of classical utilitarianism that it values
only pleasure, without taking any direct interest in freedom, rights,
creativity or actual living conditions. To insist on the mechanical comfort
of having just one homogeneous ‘good thing’ would be to deny our humanity of
reasoning creatures. It is like to make the life of the chef easier by
finding something which –and which alone – we all like (such as smoked
salmon, or perhaps even French fries), or some one quality which we must all
try to maximize (such as the saltiness of the food). (Sen
1999, p. 77)4. The system
he proposes instead is, to the contrary, based on a “plurality of focus” (Sen 1987, p. 63). As Sen
explains in “Capability and Well-Being”: Because of the nature of the evaluative space, the capability approach
differs from utilitarian evaluation (...) in making room for a variety of
human acts and states as important in themselves (not just because
they may produce utility, nor just to the extent that they yield
utility). (Sen 1993, p. 33). At first,
all this seems obvious: who can deny the importance of “self respect”, of
“fulfilling one’s creativity”, of “avoiding morbidity”, etc.? No one I suspect, not even the utilitarians. So then why did they stick to a single
criterion? This is a very old question, as old as ethics, but one which Sen seems to ignore. He contents himself with criticizing
the “arbitrary” and “defective” nature (Sen 1987,
p. 62) of monist approaches, as if he did not know of this long-standing
problem so central to philosophical ethics. The problem of the multiplicity of ethical criteria
If the
multiplicity of ethical criteria has been refused by all great philosophers,
utilitarian or not, it is for a very simple reason: it does not permit one to
settle all situations with which a philosopher , or a man of action, may be
confronted. John Stuart Mill
summarized the problem as follows: There exists no moral system under which
there do not arise equivocal cases of conflicting obligation. These are the
real difficulties, the knotty points both in the theory of ethics, and in the
conscientious guidance of personal conduct. (…) If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations,
utility may be invoked to decide between them when their demands are
incompatible. Though the application of the standard may be difficult, it is
better than none at all: while in other systems, the moral laws claiming
independent authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere
between them; their claims to precedence one over the other rest on little better
than sophistry, and unless determined, as they generally are, by the
acknowledged influence of considerations of utility, afford a free scope for
the actions of personal desires and partialities. We must remember that only
in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that
first principles should be appealed to” (emphasis added) (Mill 1861, pp. 157-158). Adam Smith
(admired by Sen) also used a monist criteria : “ All constitutions of government (…) are valued only in proportion as
they tend to promote the happiness of those who live under them. This is
their sole use and end. ” (Smith 1790, p. 185). Emmanuel
Kant, a non-utilitarian philosopher with whom Sen
claims affinity, was also very clear on this subject: Considered objectively, there can be only one human reason. (…) So the
moralist rightly says that there is only one virtue and one doctrine
of virtue, that is, a single system that connects all duties of virtue by one
principle.” (Kant 1796, p. 81). Relying on
an ultimate criterion enables one to make, in all cases, a choice between two
actions, rules, or institutions that are in conflict with one another. In the
capability approach, how is one to choose between constructing a school and
building a dam? No one knows. Séverine Deneulin seems to feel there is a problem when she
explains and asks: “Sen gives a reason for not
specifying what is to be counted as relevant capabilities: his concern for
pluralism. (…). [But, ] if one refuses to take any position regarding the ends
that are to be promoted, how then can
we know which opportunities have to be given to people in order to improve
their quality of life? How can we give people conditions for a better human
life, without knowing what a better life consists of?” (Deneulin
2002, pp. 500-501). Thus, Sen’s pluralist
perspective is precisely what makes the approach non-operational for policy
makers. This leads
us to Jorge Buzaglo’s arguments. He rejects the
partition of economics between the categories “orthodox/heterodox”, and
asserts that although Amartya Sen
is an orthodox economist, he applies the “conventional apparatus to the
advancement of a progressive cause”. Beyond
the homo economicus? Jorge Buzaglo believes
that the real force of the capability approach is that it enables us to go
beyond the “homo economicus model of
conventional microeconomics [which] does not specify how the preferences of
the mind have been themselves determined, and even less how the mind
determines the body to perform its “optimal” decisions in the market”. He
proposes, following the “Spinozian roots” of the
capability approach, to introduce “the notion of an (intersubjective)
economic mental space”, which would make parts of standard theory lose their
“enchanting power”: “A case in point is the Arrow-Debreu
model of general equilibrium, the central piece of conventional economic
theory, and the archetype of interaction between atomistic, self-caused
minds, and passive bodies (consumers, factor owners, firms, etc.) acting in
the markets”. A few things
need to be noted here. First, Amartya Sen has never rejected
the Arrow-Debreu model: he simply proposes to
adjust it in order to extend it “to the perspective of substantial freedoms”
(Sen 1999, p. 119). Second, Sen
has never criticized the notion of society that this model represents.
Regardless of how consumers are represented, the Arrow Debreu
model of general equilibrium is not a representation of
“decentralized” or “market economies”, as Sen (Sen 1999, p. 117) and Buzaglo
imply. The society represented is a centralized system with price-taker
agents and an auctioneer that establishes, through “tâtonnement”,
the prices on the basis of the total quantities supplied and demanded. Agents
can neither propose prices nor exchange directly. Changing the
representation of the consumer in microeconomic theory (from the homo economicus to some other representation) does not change the nature of the
society which is represented. It does not remove the “enchanting power”
of “markets”, which, in the idealized theoretical case, are
centralised systems. Because the
society described by the Arrow-Debreu model refers
to some kind of planned economy, real-life reforms based on this model would
entail “more imposed rules”, “given prices”, etc. Yet this is far from being Sen’s position. In fact if one looks at Sen’s works concerning the intervention of the state in
the economy, no clear position can be found. Indeed, his stance is highly
ambiguous and sometimes contradicts the theoretical framework he retains,
that is, the Arrow-Debreu model. For example,
in “Radical Needs and Moderate Reforms”, Sen
claims, concerning the economic reforms aiming at India’s
“liberalisation” and “deregulation”,
that: The departures are too moderate – and too tolerant of parts of established
tradition of economic planning in India. More – rather than less --
radicalism is needed at this time. (Sen 1997, p. 4) He also
says: The counter productive nature of some of the governmental
restrictions, controls and regulations has been clear for a long time. They
have not only interfered with the efficiency of economic operations
(especially for modern industries), but also have often failed lamentably to
promote any kind of real equity in distributional matters. (ibid, p. 9) Yet, Sen admits in another book written with Jean Drèze: The government may have a major role in initiating and facilitating
market-reliant economic growth (…) This role is easy to understand in the
light of economic theory – particularly related to difficulties of
initiation, connected with such difficulties of ‘tâtonnement’
(pre-exchange negotiations about market prices, leading to simultaneous
production decisions), economies of large scale, importance of technological
externalities, and the integral nature of skill formation. The nurturing of
an early market mechanism by an active state does not, of course, preclude a
more self-sufficient role of the market later on.” (Drèze
& Sen 1995, p. 19)5. Drèze and Sen would still have to explain how, theoretically, this
“market” could “later on” be “more self-sufficient”… One can
indeed ask: Are the European and the US
markets “self sufficient”? To answer these sorts of questions, one has
to think about what markets really are, to reflect on their actual “mechanisms”,
etc.. And, as far as I know, studying Sen doesn’t
help much in tackling these difficult questions. Conclusion
Although Amartya Sen possesses admirable
personal qualities (tolerance, enthusiasm and, as I myself experienced during
an OFCE conference in Paris, a great sense of
humour), I really do not see how the theory he proposes can be used for
analysing real-world issues, nor how his positions in matters of economic
policy can be considered “radical” or “progressive”: Sen doesn’t
propose anything, except generalities about “freedom”, education, and health.
Furthermore, he never treats issues relating to the means to implement these
general positions: How are the schools to be financed? What fiscal system
leads to the “equality of capabilities”? Furthermore,
wouldn’t it be most peculiar if international organisations such as the World
Bank took as a reference point a “progressive” and “radical” economist? Sure, some neoclassical economists take
“radical” and “progressive” positions. For example, Joseph Stiglitz harshly criticized IMF
policy and supported Argentina’s non payment. But this is far from being Sen’s case, since he has never offered clear and open
positions on concrete matters. Notes
1. Emmanuelle Benicourt,
“Is Amartya Sen a
Post-Autistic Economist?”, post-autistic
economics review, issue
no. 15, September 4, 2002, article 4. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue15.htm. 2. Ingrid Robeyns, “In Defence of Amartya
Sen, post-autistic
economics review, issue no. 17, December 4, 2002, article
5. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue17. 3. Jorge Buzaglo,
“Capabilities: From Spinoza to Sen and Beyond.:
Parts I and II”, post-autistic economics review, issues no.
20 and 21, June and September 2003, http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue20.htm
and http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue21.htm. 4.He had already critiqued monist approaches in On
Ethics and Economics: “In the utilitarian approach all the diverse goods
are reduced into a homogeneous descriptive magnitude (as utility is supposed
to be). (…) Not only is there a unified complete view of ethical goodness
(weighting the different objects of value vis-à-vis each other), but even the
objects of value must be all of the same type (singular and
homogeneous) in this ‘monist’ conception.” (Sen
1987, pp. 62-63). 5.They also assert: “the formal theory of
achievements of the market mechanism is, implicitly, much dependent on
governmental action” (Drèze & Sen 1995, p. 19). Bibliography
Deneulin,
Séverine (2002), “Perfectionism,
paternalism and liberalism in Sen and Nussbaum’s Capability approach”, Review of Political Economy, Vol.14, N°4, October 2002, pp. 497-518. Drexe,
Jean & Sen, Amartya
K. (1995), India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity, Oxford,
Clarendon Press. Kant, Emmanuel (1796), Métaphysique des mœurs :
doctrine du droit,
Paris, Librairie Philosophique
J. Vrin, 1988. Mill, John Stuart (1861), Utilitarianism,
in Utilitarianism, On Liberty
and Other Essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 129-201. Sen,
Amartya K. (1987), On Ethics and Economics, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. Sen,
Amartya K. (1993), “Capability and Well-Being”, Nussbaum
& Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 30-53. Sen,
Amartya K. (1997) “Radical Needs and Moderate
Reforms”, Drèze & Sen
(eds.), Indian Development: Selected
Regional Perspectives, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Sen,
Amartya K. (1999), Development as Freedom, New York, Anchor Books, 2000. Smith, Adam (1790), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, The Glasgow Edition, Ed. D. D.
Raphael & A. L. Macfie, Indianapolis, Liberty
Fund, 1976. ______________________________
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