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The
Social and Intellectual Organization and Construction
of Economics
Kyle Siler (Department of Sociology, McMaster University, Canada)
© Copyright 2003 Kyle
Siler
Most of the articles published in the Post-Autistic Economics Review focus on challenging and/or
refuting mainstream economic theory. This tacitly serves as a means of
precipitating further thought about economics, and in most cases, also
functions as a means of promoting change in the discipline. However, as
evidenced by history, be it the notion that the Earth revolves around the
Sun, the double-helix model of DNA, or the hegemony of mainstream
neoclassical economics today, merely having innovative, or possibly better
ideas, does not necessarily equate with the ability to establish immediate
scientific and societal acceptance of those ideas, or “truth.” Hence,
changing economics will be a “social” process, in addition to being a
“scientific” process. Or, as per Stephen Cole's (1992) work, economics, like
any “science”, is comprised of both socially-constructed and “scientific”
components. The Post-Autistic Economics
Review has, and will continue to deal with the latter extensively. I
propose to introduce the former to its readership.
My account of the social construction of economics is largely derived from
British sociologist Richard Whitley's (1984) seminal work, The Social and
Intellectual Organization of the Sciences. The crux of Whitley’s argument
is that, in addition to what they study empirically, scientific fields are
shaped and affected by the degrees and types of mutual dependence and task
uncertainty they possess. The next two sections will explain how these
characteristics exist and function in mainstream neoclassical economics.
Mutual Dependence
Whitley (p. 88) broadly defined mutual dependence as “…the need to
adhere to particular standards of competence and criteria of significance in
order to reward important reputations for contributions.” More specifically,
mutual dependence is comprised of two analytically distinct agents: functional
and strategic dependence. Economics has high functional dependence, as economists generally have to adhere to
a dominant neoclassical strategic paradigm to be taken seriously. Conversely,
it also has low strategic dependence,
as due to this consensus, economists generally spend little time arguing over
theoretical issues. Hence, most debates about theoretical issues outside of
the dominant orthodoxy usually occur outside of mainstream economic forums
(such as is the case with the Post-Autistic
Economics Review).
Whitley (p. 31) also adds that “intellectual fields must have distinctive
work procedures if they are to function as reputational
work organizations.” These distinctive work procedures set the context for
self-conscious and self-regulating colleague groups being based “on their
power to validate the expertise, and thus mediate the careers of, members (p.
20).” The arcane and esoteric mathematical nature of neoclassical economics
is a powerful context, contributing to a very strong, unified organizational
discipline, thus influencing both the profession and “science” of economics.
Mathematics is not only an effective means of creating scholarly hierarchies,
but also makes economic work difficult to comment on (at least in the
mainstream economists’ domain and language) for non-mathematical economists.
This places control over the discipline largely into the hands of the most
advanced mathematical economists, while insulating and empowering the
discipline as a whole. Social and cultural norms which value abstractness,
theoretical complexity, esoteric science and quantification also help make economics
trusted, well-supported and respected.
As mutual dependence (which is the basis for much of economics’ power and
prestige) increases, local and individual circumstances tend to become
irrelevant. Hence, it is not surprising that economics tends to privilege
abstract thought, shunning context and historically dependent work. There are
a number of factors that are indicative of the high mutual dependence in
economics. These include:
- The existence of a
relatively small, concentrated, theoretical disciplinary core of
economists.
- Shunning of
cross-disciplinary and heterodox thought.
- Agreed upon
hierarchies of competence and knowledge.
- Insulation from the
“lay public” and most other academics.
- The existence of a
“Nobel Prize”, which serves to galvanize the discipline, and confer
significant prestige upon economics as a whole in public perception, and
upon the winning economists, who tend to further perpetuate the
prevailing orthodoxy.
It is difficult to ascertain whether these characteristics are causes and/or
effects of high mutual dependence (or each other). Regardless, this complex
interweaving of social characteristics is a strong factor helping create,
insulate and empower mainstream economics.
Economics and Task Uncertainty
The social sciences are generally characterized by a greater degree of
task uncertainty than most of the natural sciences. Laboratory controls and
manipulation of research subjects are generally not viable options in social
science research. Economists cannot manipulate the behavior
of governments, firms and actors in various contexts in order to test and
re-test hypotheses about economies.1 Whitley (p. 120) observes that “…the more
paradigm-bound a field is, the more predictable, visible and replicable are
research results, and the more limited is permissible novelty.” Hence, the
degree of task uncertainty in a field is influenced by a socially constructed
component, via the social organization of a given discipline, apart from
empirical, data-based, or “scientific” considerations.
Whitley (ch. 4) identifies three major contextual
factors that influence task uncertainty:
Reputational
Autonomy This alludes to the degree to which
a given field can adjudicate standards of quality and worthiness without
influences from other interests. Mainstream economics is empowered with a
very high degree of reputational autonomy. As an
example of this, while the government and the lay public are generally
unwilling (or unable) to engage in dialogue with academic economists on their
own terms, they are willing to be “amateur” sociologists on such issues as
inequality and culture. Further, while some social science departments are
prone to being subsumed by “topical” or “interdisciplinary” studies in
universities, economists are generally immune. In addition, when economists
do participate in interdisciplinary work (i.e. for the government), they
usually do so “on their terms”, and are consequently more of a “consultant”
than “collaborator.”
Concentration over the means of
intellectual production and dissemination Economics has relatively high concentration in journals, paradigmatic
thought, prestige and universities. This is in part a result of (or
contributor to) its aforementioned high reputational
autonomy. As an example of the degree of concentration of intellectual
production in the United States, Pieper and Willis (1999: 86) show
that 54% of economics faculty at doctoral universities, and more than
two-thirds of the thesis supervisors at the 47 top-ranked programs in the
United States come from one of the “top ten” schools. These “top ten” schools
include Chicago, Harvard, Stanford, and MIT; among the strongest purveyors of
highly mathematical neoclassical economics. As Devine (2001) observed, the
more famous the university, journal or student, the more likely they are to
adhere to the rigid positivism of neoclassical economics. The degree of
control these schools have over economic education is well evidenced by a
report done by, the Commission on Graduate Education in Economics in the
United States, which concluded that “the content and structure of graduate
programs is amazingly similar” (Hansen, 1991: p. 1085).
Audience Plurality and Diversity
Economics has relatively low audience plurality and diversity,
largely due to the practice of conducting esoteric, mathematical research
published in academic journals kept largely away from public scrutiny.
Economists seldom write books, and if they are written in a publicly
accessible fashion, they are often derided as “lacking rigor”, or as mere “Galbraithism.” Further, academic economics is also
“shielded” by the fact that most public “economic” debate occurs outside of
the academic sphere, far removed from the behavioral
assumptions and arcane analyses couched in powerful academic economics
journals, and textbooks. This will be discussed further shortly.
All of the above serve to “socially” reduce mainstream economics’ (perceived)
task uncertainty, despite the fact that it operates in the complex,
contextual realms of the human sciences. This apparent contradiction will be
explored in the next section.
Economics as a Partitioned Bureaucracy
Economics is extremely unusual in academia in that it combines the high
technical task uncertainty of the social sciences, with very low strategic
task uncertainty. Whitley (181) states that this mix should be highly
unstable unless the central core of conceptual orthodoxy is partitioned
away from empirical sources of uncertainty. Hence, privileging
theoretical data (informed by the “central core”), at the expense of
empirical considerations is a necessary condition for maintaining strategic
consensus in the discipline. Mainstream economics does exactly that. As in
many facets of economics, there is a clear hierarchy (made possibly by high
mutual dependence) of sub-fields in economics, with the more theoretical endeavors enjoying epistemological, and organizational
superiority. This occurs both within and outside of economics. Within
economics, econometrics, labor, and health
economics, and other relatively “applied” work remains subordinated to, and
to a certain extent, derivative of the dominant paradigm, couched in the
theoretical core of the discipline. Doing “applied”, or socially relevant
work is acceptable to mainstream economists, provided you adhere to the
dominant neoclassical paradigm (i.e. Gary Becker). Outside of economics, much
“applied” or context-dependent work is actually done in business/finance or
other social science departments in universities, and by businesses and
governments outside of academia. In the case of business and finance
departments using economic theory, there appears to be somewhat of a
symbiotic relationship, where business schools use neoclassical economics for
a methodological and moral legitimation, while
economics gets insulated from empirical concerns and uncertainty that could
undermine their strategic consensus, and call the dominant orthodoxy into
question. This symbiotic relationship also may help contribute to maintaining
(if not reinforcing) the “bourgeois” focus of mainstream economics, which
tends to trumpet the virtues of capitalism far more than it criticizes the
economic, social and moral shortcomings it may possess.
Concluding Thoughts
John Kenneth Galbraith (1984: 3) remarked that the shortcomings of
contemporary economics are not necessarily due to original error, but
“uncorrected obsolescence.” Given the intricate tapestry of social,
empirical, and organizational factors buttressing mainstream economics today,
it is no wonder that the neoclassical paradigm is not evolving with the times
or evidence. While the Post-Autistic
Economics Review illustrates many of the excellent thoughts and debates
that, at the very least, challenge the dominant economic paradigm, merely
being “right” scientifically and morally, is not sufficient to significantly
modify a discipline, especially one as powerful and entrenched as economics.
Not only does Whitley’s model help explain why mainstream economics is so
powerful (in addition to factors extraneous to his model, such as bourgeois
ties and values), but also how it can remain so in the face of inconsistent
empirical evidence. Although I cannot profess to know the best strategy for
reforming economics, knowledge of the social construction of “science” and
“economics” should be a vital part of constructing any such strategy. As
opposition to mainstream economics burgeons, it should be kept in mind by
such dissenting groups that scientific change is not entirely a “scientific” endeavor. This could aid the construction of strategy for
social and scientific change, both in academic and lived realms, as the two
are inexorably linked.
Note
1. This limitation
also characterizes the natural sciences to varying degrees, especially
biology.
References
Cole, Stephen. Making
Science: Between Nature and Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1992.
Devine, James G. “Psychological Autism, Institutional Autism and Economics”. Post-Autistic
Economics Review. Issue no. 16, September 16, 2002, article 2. http://www.btinternet.com/~paenews/review/issue16.htm
Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Affluent Society. 4th ed.,
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984.
Hansen, W.L. The education and training of
economics doctorates: Major Findings of the American Economics Association
commission on graduate education in economics. Journal of Economic
Literature, 1991, 31, 3, pp. 1054-87.
Pieper, Paul J. and Willis, Rachel A. “The Doctoral Origins of Economics
Faculty and the Education of New Economics Doctorates”. Journal of
Economic Education. Winter 1999, pp. 80-89.
Whitley, Richard. The Social and Intellectual Organization of the Sciences.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
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SUGGESTED
CITATION:
Kyle Siler, “The Social and
Intellectual Organization and Construction of Economics”, post-autistic
economics review, issue no. 22,
24 November 2003, article 3, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue22/Siler22.htm
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