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Capabilities: From Spinoza to Sen and Beyond
Part I : Spinoza’s Theory of Capabilities
(Part II: A
Spinoza-Sen Economics Research Program will appear in the next issue)
Jorge
Buzaglo
(University of
Gothenburg, Sweden)
In a recent article
in this review, Emmanuelle Benicourt (2002)
challenges heterodox economists to explain why they consider Amartya Sen’s theoretical
approach a real force for reform in economics. I would like to communicate
here what I see as a real force for change in Amartya
Sen’s approach to the economic dimension of human
development. I would like to describe some of the genealogy of the approach,
and also to show the potential that this critical tradition has for the
renewal of economics.
Before I embark in
my task I would like to refer to Emmanuelle Benicourt’s
orthodox/heterodox partition of economics, which I do not think is very
useful. Both categories are too heterogeneous to be helpful. If we consider
what I think is a more useful categorization, that between conventional and
progressive economics (or similar characterizations, such as
conservative/radical, bourgeois/socialist, etc.), we will find orthodox and
heterodox economists in both categories. Amartya Sen, for instance, is an orthodox economist, as both he
and Emmanuelle Benicourt point out (Amartya Sen says “mainstream
economist”). He is an orthodox economist because he uses the conventional
apparatus of ordinary neoclassical theory.
But as I see it, he is a progressive
orthodox economist, since he applies this conventional apparatus to the
advancement of a progressive cause, namely, the cause of equality.1
The equality he advocates is not merely economistic/utilitarian,
but refers also to all other dimensions (“functionings”)
of human existence. A quite radical message indeed, articulated in the suave
and diplomatic language of neoclassical economics. One can only speculate if
this is an Aesopian strategy of telling subversive truths in covered
language, or if it would be better or more effective to develop a more
appropriate heterodox idiom to say the same thing. But it must be admitted
that many a heterodox economist would shy away from so radical an objective
for economic science and human development.
I will argue here
that Sen’s radical approach to human welfare is not
new, and that the original source of the approach contains other important
and deep insights. I will also argue that this same source inspires some
present-day approaches to natural science, and could also inspire the renewal
of economics that Emmanuelle Benicourt longs for.
The “hideous hypothesis” of The Ethics
The source I am
thinking of is The Ethics of Baruch de Spinoza.2
Spinoza’s doctrine of capabilities in The
Ethics prefigures rather explicitly
Amartya Sen’s ideas, but
it does not seem that Sen was aware of it. For one
thing, Amartya Sen is
very open and magnanimous with his sources and credits ─ he refers to Aristoteles’ Nicomachian Ethics,
Marx’s Manuscript of 1844 and Adam
Smith’s Wealth of Nations as
sources of inspiration.3 Also, the doctrine of capabilities, in
spite of its crucial importance in Spinoza’s message, if barely mentioned, is
not given the importance it deserves in most of the expositions, commentaries
and criticisms of The Ethics I am aware of.4 This
was perhaps due to the fact that the doctrine appears among what are
considered the most difficult and “mystical” propositions of the last half of
Part 5, which usually repulse narrowly conceived positivism. In these last
propositions Spinoza explains when and in what sense the human mind can be
said to be eternal.
In
effect, in 5.39 (Part 5, Proposition 39), Spinoza affirms that
He, who possesses a body capable of the
greatest number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is
eternal.5
Let us recall that The Ethics is composed in the axiomatic-deductive mode, with all
propositions deduced from preceding propositions, lemmas, axioms and
definitions.6 Proposition
5.39 is demonstrated as follows.
Proof. He, who possesses a body capable of the
greatest number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which are
evil ([by proposition] 4.38)
─ that is (4.30) those emotions which are contrary to our nature;
therefore (5.10), he possesses the power of arranging and associating the
modifications of the body according to the intellectual order, and,
consequently [5.14, missing in the Elwes version], of bringing it about, that all the
modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God [or
Nature, or Substance; i.e. self caused, infinite, eternal being]; whence it will come to pass that (5.15)
he will be affected with love toward God, which (5.16) must occupy or
constitute the chief part of the mind; therefore (5.33), such a man will
possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. QED.
The first
proposition referred to in the proof is crucial for the understanding of
Spinoza’s doctrine of capability. Proposition 4.38 states that
Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to
render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways, or
affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is useful to man;
and is so, in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of
being affected or affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways;
contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is
hurtful to man.
Proof: Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities
of the body increases also the mind’s capability of perception (2.14); therefore, whatsoever thus
disposes the body and renders it capable, is necessarily good or useful
(4.26, 4.27); and is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render
the body capable; contrariwise (2.14, 4.26, 4.27), it is hurtful, if it
renders the body in this respect less capable. QED.
That is, the proof
says that whatsoever increases the capabilities of the body also increases
the mind’s capability of understanding. And what increases our power of
understanding is certainly good.
In order to prove
that whatsoever increases the body’s capabilities also increases the
capabilities of the mind, the proof uses Proposition 2.14, which states that
The human mind is capable of
perceiving a great number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is
capable of receiving a great number of impressions.
Spinoza could also have stated that the reciprocal statement is also
true; that whatsoever increases the capabilities of the mind augments also
the capabilities of the body. That is, the proof could have used the often
quoted Proposition 2.7, base of Spinoza’s so called body/mind “parallelism”
theory:
The order and connexion of
ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.
The Note to this proposition further affirms this same idea, that
is, that
[…] substance thinking and
substance extended are one and the same substance [God or Nature], comprehended now through one attribute,
now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that
mode are one and the same thing. This truth seems to have been dimly
recognized by those Jews who maintained that God, God’s intellect, and the
things understood by God are identical.
Now, we know also from the Note to Proposition 2.1 that
[…] in proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more
thoughts [or, what is the same, as an extended being is conceived as
capable of more activities], so it is
conceived as containing more reality or perfection.
This relationship between increased capabilities and increased
perfection or reality can be used for an alternative explanation of our
starting Proposition 5.39, on the relationship between capability and
eternity. Spinoza affirms in the same Note to 2.1:
Therefore a being which can think an
infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways [or, what is the
same, which can perform infinite acts in an infinite number of ways], is, necessarily, in respect of thinking [or
in respect of extension],
infinite."
Infinite thoughts are timeless, eternal thoughts. A being capable of
thinking infinite thoughts would be thinking eternal thoughts. Such a being
would be so sharing, as to say, in eternity, insofar as it thinks
infinite/eternal thoughts.7 Also, psychophysical identity
(“parallelism”) would suggest that a mind which is thinking infinite thoughts
has an extended correlate which is performing infinite acts. This would be
one way of interpreting the relationship between capability and eternity in
Proposition 5.39.
Spinoza’s demonstration of 5.39 quoted above recurs to his idea of scientia intuitiva.
The proof says that the larger the capabilities of the body, the greater the
faculties of the mind (and vice versa, we should add); in particular, the
greater is the capability of the mind of rationally comprehending its
emotions. The mind will be thus more able to form clear and distinct ideas;
that is, ideas that can be referred to the idea of God or Nature, since
whatsoever is (or is conceived in the mind), is in God or Nature. Spinoza
calls this ability of the mind scientia intuitiva, and this type of knowledge third kind of knowledge, by which the
mind conceives things under the form of eternity (sub specie aeternitatis).8
Now, the mind, regarding its own power of comprehension, is affected of
pleasure, being this pleasure accompanied by the idea of God or Nature (so
much the more in proportion as it understands itself and its emotions).
According to Spinoza, pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause
is love. Pleasure accompanied by the idea of God or Nature is what Spinoza
calls intellectual love of God.
This intellectual love is an activity whereby God or Nature ─ insofar
it can be explained through the human mind ─ regards itself accompanied
by the idea of itself. Since God or Nature is an absolutely infinite being,
this love of the mind is part of the infinite love wherewith God or Nature
loves itself. This love, this knowledge sub
specie aeternitatis, is possible for the mind
insofar as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity. And this
idea, which expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity, is
necessarily eternal.
The above ideas are indeed difficult and mind-boggling.9
They nevertheless clearly point towards the idea of human growth or human
perfection as the increasing realm of human capabilities of thought and
activity, that is, of effective freedom (cf. Sen
1999). Human perfection depends on expanded domains of activity for every
individual on every conceivable dimension of human existence, which implies
also increased domains of knowledge and understanding in enlarged dimensions
of thought. Human development does not
depend on increased levels of “utility” derived from consumption.10
Notes
1. There are many well known
economists in this category. Serge-Christophe Kolm could for instance be mentioned, as a continental
member of this class.
2. The “hideous hypothesis” of “that
famous atheist” was “the doctrine of the simplicity of the universe, and the
unity of that substance, in which he supposes both thought and matter to
inhere” (Hume 1911 [1739-40], p. 229). (I must say that I do not agree with
the word “simplicity” in Hume’s description; the reasons why will be apparent
in what follows.) According to Jonathan
Israel (2001, p. 159) “hideous” could had been an ironic characterization.
Hume belonged in fact to the same banned category of radical Enlightenment
thinkers such as Diderot, Voltaire and Spinoza
himself (Israel 2001, p.109). Curiously, Diderot’s
article on Spinoza in the Encyclopédie could be also said to be “ironic.”
3. See for instance Sen (1988). By the way, the young Marx was a dedicated
student of Spinoza (see e.g. Rubel 1978). Aristoteles’ ideas do not exactly prefigure Sen’s (or Spinoza’s) notion of capabilities ─ see e.g. the discussion of
the “Aristotelian Principle” in Rawls (1999, § 65).
4. As an assiduous reader of Spinoza
literature, I know that I am aware of only one small portion of it. According
for instance to the Swedish bibliographic database (www.libris.kb.se) there are 743 Spinoza
related books in Nordic libraries ─ 42 of them published in 2001-2002.
(Journal articles must most probably be counted in the thousands. There are
also several Spinoza websites.) The increasing rate of publication may
perhaps be announcing the near fulfilment of Lichtenberg’s (1990 [1800-1806],
p.115) famous prediction: “If the world should endure for an incalculable
number of years the universal religion [ethics] will be a purified Spinozism. Left to itself, reason can lead to nothing
else and it is impossible that it ever will lead to anything else.”
5. I quote from the Elwes’ version in compact disc in Lire l’Éthique de Spinoza, Phronésis, Paris, 1998.
6. The title of The Ethics in the
original is Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata.
Possibly Spinoza chose this mode of argumentation because of its overwhelming
power of conviction. For many centuries The
Elements of Euclid was second only to The
Bible in number of extant copies. Also, the prominence of mathematics and
natural science was rapidly growing in XVIIth
century Europe.
7. For a suggestive comparison of this
insight with the insight of meditation, see Wetlesen
(1977).
8. Spinoza’s first and second kinds of
knowledge can be succinctly described as hearsay or opinion and science
respectively.
9.
But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare. Spinoza’s own
reply in the last words of The Ethics
comes naturally to the mind.
10. Increased levels of passive consumption or leisure, from The Ethic’s perspective, might indeed
be seen as lessening human
perfection. Cf. Proposition 5.4: In
proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active,
and less passive; and, vice versâ, in proportion as it is more active, so
it is more perfect. But of course in most cases increasing capabilities
involve increased consumption and/or investment.
References
Benicourt, Emmanuelle,
2002, “Is Amartya Sen a
Post-Autistic Economist?” post-autistic
economics review, Issue no. 15, September 4.
Hume, David, 1911 [1739-40], Treatise of Human Nature - Volume I, J.M.Dent
& Sons, London.
Israel, Jonathan I., 2001, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the
Making of Modernity 1650-1750, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Lichtenberg, Georg C., 1990 [1800-1806], Aphorisms, Penguin, London
.
Rawls, John, 1999, A Theory of Justice – Revised Edition,
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Rubel, Maximilien, 1978,
“Marx à la rencontre de Spinoza”, Économies
et Sociétés, Jan.Feb., vol.12, pp.239-65.
Sen, Amartya, 1988, “The Concept of Development,” in H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan (eds.), Handbook
of Development Economics – Volume I, North Holland, Amsterdam.
Sen, Amartya, 1999, Development
as Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Wetlesen, Jon, 1977, “Body
awareness as a gateway to eternity,” in S. Hessing
(ed.), Speculum Spinozanum,
1677-1977, Routledge, London.
(Part II: A
Spinoza-Sen Economics Research Program will appear in the next issue)
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SUGGESTED CITATION:
Jorge Buzaglo, “Capabilities:
From Spinoza to Sen and Beyond. Part I : Spinoza’s
Theory of Capabilities”, post-autistic economics review,
issue no. 20, 3 June 2003, article 6, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue20/Buzaglo20.htm
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