post-autistic economics review
Issue no. 17,  4 December 2002
article 3

 

 

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Defining "Economics" Inclusively

Tony Aspromourgos   (University of Sydney, Australia)

© Copyright 2002 Tony Aspromourgos


In following the contributions and debates in this Review it has struck me that there is a need for a definition of economics which is wider and more inclusive than the old Wicksteed-inspired formula articulated by Lionel Robbins, in terms of the allocation of scarce means to inexhaustible purposes. By the very terms of its constitution, this definition tends towards defining the discipline as marginalist. That is to say, it tends naturally to the normative inference that orthodox economics is (the only legitimate) economics. Any definition of more generality should be concise, constitutive and programmatic. I offer the following for consideration: In the most general terms, economics is the study of how societies organize the production and distribution of the means of human sustenance and larger consumption. This is constitutive and programmatic in the sense that it defines a proper domain for the discipline – and points to a desirable set of research programmes which ought to be undertaken.

 

Its inclusiveness – or, if one prefers, its expansiveness – should be evident. The classical-Marxian orientation towards material reproduction and distribution, with the price system as a conduit for the associated allocation of commodities, fits naturally into this definition. Keynesianism (and hence also the effective demand dimension of Kalecki) can be articulated within its domain – as a theory of how, in certain kinds of political societies, there may be no spontaneous mechanism to ensure an optimal level of resource utilization, and hence sub-optimal activity levels and consumption outcomes occur. The evolution of social organization and institutions also finds a natural place, as the study of how the politico-social mechanisms for effecting consumption have varied. Hence those associated with the Historical School, evolutionary economics and Institutionalism find a legitimate place.

 

My definition also avoids the asocial orientation of marginalism by taking its point of departure from social organization, rather than from independent individuals. Furthermore, it embraces the study of current, past, or even future (including ‘ideal’), societies. Hence it does not discriminate against economic history – economic history is included in a natural way in the definition, as well as economic anthropology and economic sociology. (The discipline definitely would be better off if some of the resources currently devoted to theorizing were redeployed to historical studies. There is too much of the former and far too little of the latter.) The study of ‘ideal’ societies points to normative analysis – in orthodox language, welfare economics – though of course, non-orthodox welfare economics need not only proceed on such a grand scale.

 

If it is felt that nature and the natural environment should be more explicit in the definition, then ‘extraction,’ could be inserted before ‘production’ in the definition. In fact, the focus on ‘sustenance’ is suggestive of sustainability – and indeed, the classical focus on reproduction of social economies is, at core, a notion of sustainability (including scarcity of an objective kind, rather than the subjective marginalist form).

 

The definition offered here might also have the effect of orienting the various, current subdisciplines of economics more towards the final, human, material purpose of economic systems. This need not in all respects involve radical departure from conventional thinking. Hence, for example, the theory of finance has as its purpose the study of instruments and systems for enabling the intertemporal shifting of consumption. This is not a heterodox proposition, even if participants in financial analysis often lose sight of this ultimate (legitimate) social purpose of financial systems.

 

Consumption is not the ultimate human purpose of course; but beyond survival, the purposes consumption serves seem not to be something economics can say anything very significant about. Certainly orthodox economics has offered little beyond empirically empty nonsense-tautologies like ‘utility’ and ‘preference’. (Why not just say ‘people are what they are’ and be done with it!) The referring of consumption demand back to deeper underlying characteristics of commodities may be a fruitful way towards saying more.

 

From the standpoint of my suggested definition of economics, the marginalist approach then appears as the study of the distribution or allocation of a given set of resources to the achievement of (some of) a given set of possible (ranked) uses. Hence my definition does not, and does not seek to, exclude orthodox economics – it rather locates it as one approach, to one particular kind of question, in a larger and more general context.

 

Or perhaps it does exclude one dimension of the marginalist intellectual project in its widest form: the idea that its method (constrained individual optimization, with or without strategic interaction) can be a general theory of human psychology and choice as such – hence the idea that it can explain getting married, having children, going to war, committing suicide, and so on. By orienting the subject matter towards ‘economics’ in the common sense of that term, my definition marginalizes (pun intended) these pretensions. Get back to the study of ‘guns and butter’ (or, in a classical vein, machine tools and corn) boys and girls! ‘It’s the economy, stupid’ – indeed.


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SUGGESTED CITATION:
Tony Aspromourgos, “Defining 'Economics' Inclusively”, post-autistic economics review, issue no. 17,
December 4, 2002, article 3. http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue17/Aspromourgos17.htm