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post-autistic
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issue 24
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Amartya Sen Again Emmanuelle Benicourt (École des Hautes
Etudes en Sciences Sociales, France) © Copyright 2004
Emmanuelle Benicourt In issue 15
of this journal1, I argued that Sen was a neoclassical economist,
and questioned why heterodox economists considered his “capability approach”
as a real force in post-autistic economics. Two responses have appeared. First, Ingrid Robeyns2 argued
that the view according to which the capability approach is undeniably
neoclassical, just a variation of standard economics, is “fundamentally
mistaken” (i.e., Sen is not neoclassical). Second, Jorge Buzaglo3
admitted Sen was neoclassical, but argued that he was a radical-progressive
economist (i.e., Sen applies the conventional apparatus to the advancement of
a progressive cause). Curiously, these responses are contradictory. I will examine each in turn.
Sen’s
normative framework Ingrid Robeyns pursues her Defence of Amartya Sen by saying : “the capability approach gives a consistent
normative framework to place these scattered studies [of development,
development ethics, unemployment, famines, gender inequality, etc] , thus
providing a sort of theoretical umbrella for existing empirical work. Moreover,
the capability approach makes it very clear how different dimensions, such as
commodities, observable outcomes and unobservable opportunities are related.” This is incorrect.
Indeed it runs contrary to Sen’s central idea. Remember that Sen’s normative
approach is deliberately pluralist. This comes from his critique of and
departure from utilitarianism. Sen refuses to apprehend well-being in a
unilateral way (with the criterion of general happiness or public utility).
As he says in Development as Freedom: To insist that there should be only one homogeneous magnitude that we
value is to reduce drastically the range of our evaluative reasoning. It is
not, for example, to the credit of classical utilitarianism that it values
only pleasure, without taking any direct interest in freedom, rights,
creativity or actual living conditions. To insist on the mechanical comfort
of having just one homogeneous ‘good thing’ would be to deny our humanity of
reasoning creatures. It is like to make the life of the chef easier by
finding something which –and which alone – we all like (such as smoked
salmon, or perhaps even French fries), or some one quality which we must all
try to maximize (such as the saltiness of the food). (Sen 1999, p. 77)4.
The system
he proposes instead is, to the contrary, based on a “plurality of focus” (Sen
1987, p. 63). As Sen explains in “Capability and Well-Being”: Because of the nature of the evaluative space, the capability approach
differs from utilitarian evaluation (...) in making room for a variety of
human acts and states as important in themselves (not just because
they may produce utility, nor just to the extent that they yield
utility). (Sen 1993, p. 33). At first, all
this seems obvious: who can deny the importance of “self respect”, of
“fulfilling one’s creativity”, of “avoiding morbidity”, etc.? No one I suspect, not even the
utilitarians. So then why did they stick to a single criterion? This is a
very old question, as old as ethics, but one which Sen seems to ignore. He
contents himself with criticizing the “arbitrary” and “defective” nature (Sen
1987, p. 62) of monist approaches, as if he did not know of this
long-standing problem so central to philosophical ethics. The problem of the multiplicity of ethical criteria
If the
multiplicity of ethical criteria has been refused by all great philosophers,
utilitarian or not, it is for a very simple reason: it does not permit one to
settle all situations with which a philosopher , or a man of action, may be
confronted. John Stuart Mill
summarized the problem as follows: There exists no moral system under which
there do not arise equivocal cases of conflicting obligation. These are the
real difficulties, the knotty points both in the theory of ethics, and in the
conscientious guidance of personal conduct. (…) If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations,
utility may be invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible.
Though the application of the standard may be difficult, it is better than
none at all: while in other systems, the moral laws claiming independent
authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere between them;
their claims to precedence one over the other rest on little better than
sophistry, and unless determined, as they generally are, by the
acknowledged influence of considerations of utility, afford a free scope for
the actions of personal desires and partialities. We must remember that only
in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that
first principles should be appealed to” (emphasis added) (Mill 1861, pp. 157-158). Adam Smith
(admired by Sen) also used a monist criteria : “ All constitutions of government (…) are valued only in proportion as
they tend to promote the happiness of those who live under them. This is
their sole use and end. ” (Smith 1790, p. 185). Emmanuel
Kant, a non-utilitarian philosopher with whom Sen claims affinity, was also
very clear on this subject: Considered objectively, there can be only one human reason. (…) So the
moralist rightly says that there is only one virtue and one doctrine
of virtue, that is, a single system that connects all duties of virtue by one
principle.” (Kant 1796, p. 81). Relying on
an ultimate criterion enables one to make, in all cases, a choice between two
actions, rules, or institutions that are in conflict with one another. In the
capability approach, how is one to choose between constructing a school and
building a dam? No one knows. Séverine Deneulin seems to feel there is a
problem when she explains and asks: “Sen gives a reason for not specifying
what is to be counted as relevant capabilities: his concern for pluralism.
(…). [But, ] if one refuses to take any position regarding the ends that are
to be promoted, how then can we know
which opportunities have to be given to people in order to improve their
quality of life? How can we give people conditions for a better human life,
without knowing what a better life consists of?” (Deneulin 2002, pp.
500-501). Thus, Sen’s pluralist perspective is precisely what makes the
approach non-operational for policy makers.
This leads
us to Jorge Buzaglo’s arguments. He rejects the partition of economics between
the categories “orthodox/heterodox”, and asserts that although Amartya Sen is
an orthodox economist, he applies the “conventional apparatus to the
advancement of a progressive cause”. Beyond
the homo economicus? Jorge
Buzaglo believes that the real force
of the capability approach is that it enables us to go beyond the “homo
economicus model of conventional microeconomics [which] does not specify
how the preferences of the mind have been themselves determined, and even
less how the mind determines the body to perform its “optimal” decisions in
the market”. He proposes, following the “Spinozian roots” of the capability
approach, to introduce “the notion of an (intersubjective) economic mental
space”, which would make parts of standard theory lose their “enchanting
power”: “A case in point is the Arrow-Debreu model of general equilibrium,
the central piece of conventional economic theory, and the archetype of
interaction between atomistic, self-caused minds, and passive bodies
(consumers, factor owners, firms, etc.) acting in the markets”. A few things
need to be noted here. First, Amartya
Sen has never rejected the Arrow-Debreu model: he simply proposes to adjust
it in order to extend it “to the perspective of substantial freedoms” (Sen 1999,
p. 119). Second, Sen has never criticized the notion of society that this
model represents. Regardless of how consumers are represented, the Arrow
Debreu model of general equilibrium is not a representation of
“decentralized” or “market economies”, as Sen (Sen 1999, p. 117) and Buzaglo
imply. The society represented is a centralized system with price-taker
agents and an auctioneer that establishes, through “tâtonnement”, the prices
on the basis of the total quantities supplied and demanded. Agents can
neither propose prices nor exchange directly. Changing the
representation of the consumer in microeconomic theory (from the homo
economicus to some other representation) does not change the nature of the society which is represented.
It does not remove the “enchanting power” of
“markets”, which, in the
idealized theoretical case, are centralised systems. Because the
society described by the Arrow-Debreu model refers to some kind of planned
economy, real-life reforms based on this model would entail “more imposed
rules”, “given prices”, etc. Yet this
is far from being Sen’s position. In fact if one looks at Sen’s works
concerning the intervention of the state in the economy, no clear position
can be found. Indeed, his stance is highly ambiguous and sometimes
contradicts the theoretical framework he retains, that is, the Arrow-Debreu
model. For example,
in “Radical Needs and Moderate Reforms”, Sen claims, concerning the economic
reforms aiming at India’s “liberalisation”
and “deregulation”, that: The departures are too moderate – and too tolerant of parts of established
tradition of economic planning in India. More – rather than less --
radicalism is needed at this time. (Sen 1997, p. 4) He also
says: The counter productive nature of some of the governmental
restrictions, controls and regulations has been clear for a long time. They
have not only interfered with the efficiency of economic operations
(especially for modern industries), but also have often failed lamentably to
promote any kind of real equity in distributional matters. (ibid, p. 9) Yet, Sen
admits in another book written with Jean Drèze: The government may have a major role in initiating and facilitating
market-reliant economic growth (…) This role is easy to understand in the
light of economic theory – particularly related to difficulties of
initiation, connected with such difficulties of ‘tâtonnement’ (pre-exchange
negotiations about market prices, leading to simultaneous production
decisions), economies of large scale, importance of technological
externalities, and the integral nature of skill formation. The nurturing of
an early market mechanism by an active state does not, of course, preclude a
more self-sufficient role of the market later on.” (Drèze & Sen 1995, p.
19)5. Drèze and Sen would still have to explain
how, theoretically, this “market” could “later on” be “more self-sufficient”… One can
indeed ask: Are the European and the US
markets “self sufficient”? To answer these sorts of questions, one has
to think about what markets really are, to reflect on their actual
“mechanisms”, etc.. And, as far as I know, studying Sen doesn’t help much in
tackling these difficult questions. Conclusion
Although
Amartya Sen possesses admirable personal qualities (tolerance, enthusiasm and,
as I myself experienced during an OFCE conference in Paris, a great sense of
humour), I really do not see how the theory he proposes can be used for
analysing real-world issues, nor how his positions in matters of economic
policy can be considered “radical” or “progressive”: Sen doesn’t propose anything, except
generalities about “freedom”, education, and health. Furthermore, he never
treats issues relating to the means to implement these general positions: How
are the schools to be financed? What fiscal system leads to the “equality of
capabilities”? Furthermore,
wouldn’t it be most peculiar if international organisations such as the World
Bank took as a reference point a “progressive” and “radical” economist? Sure, some neoclassical economists take “radical”
and “progressive” positions. For example, Joseph Stiglitz harshly criticized
IMF policy and supported Argentina’s non payment. But this is far from being
Sen’s case, since he has never offered clear and open positions on concrete
matters. Notes
1. Emmanuelle Benicourt, “Is Amartya Sen a
Post-Autistic Economist?”, post-autistic
economics review, issue
no. 15, September 4, 2002, article 4. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue15.htm. 2. Ingrid Robeyns, “In Defence of
Amartya Sen, post-autistic economics
review, issue no. 17, December 4, 2002, article 5. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue17. 3. Jorge Buzaglo, “Capabilities: From Spinoza to
Sen and Beyond.: Parts I and II”, post-autistic
economics review, issues no. 20 and 21,
June and September 2003, http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue20.htm
and http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue21.htm. 4.He had already critiqued monist approaches in On
Ethics and Economics: “In the utilitarian approach all the diverse goods
are reduced into a homogeneous descriptive magnitude (as utility is supposed
to be). (…) Not only is there a unified complete view of ethical goodness
(weighting the different objects of value vis-à-vis each other), but even the
objects of value must be all of the same type (singular and
homogeneous) in this ‘monist’ conception.” (Sen 1987, pp. 62-63). 5.They also assert: “the formal theory of
achievements of the market mechanism is, implicitly, much dependent on
governmental action” (Drèze & Sen 1995, p. 19). Bibliography
Deneulin, Séverine
(2002), “Perfectionism, paternalism and liberalism in Sen and Nussbaum’s
Capability approach”, Review of
Political Economy, Vol.14, N°4, October 2002, pp. 497-518. Drexe, Jean & Sen, Amartya K. (1995), India:
Economic Development and Social Opportunity, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Kant, Emmanuel (1796), Métaphysique des mœurs : doctrine du droit, Paris, Librairie
Philosophique J. Vrin, 1988. Mill, John Stuart (1861), Utilitarianism,
in Utilitarianism, On Liberty
and Other Essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 129-201. Sen, Amartya K. (1987), On Ethics and Economics, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. Sen, Amartya K. (1993), “Capability and
Well-Being”, Nussbaum & Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, pp. 30-53. Sen, Amartya K. (1997) “Radical Needs and
Moderate Reforms”, Drèze & Sen (eds.), Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives, Oxford,
Oxford University Press. Sen, Amartya K. (1999), Development as Freedom, New York, Anchor Books, 2000. Smith, Adam (1790), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, The Glasgow Edition, Ed. D. D.
Raphael & A. L. Macfie, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1976. ______________________________
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